ERSITY
OF MICHIGAN
MAR 3 1952
PERIODICAL
READING ROOM

Desk

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XLIX, NO. 4: FEBRUARY 14, 1952
(DOUBLE NUMBER)

CONTENTS

On a Supposed Resurgence of Vicious Intellectualism: ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY 85

Mindless Empiricism: SIDNEY HOOK 89

In Defense of Individualistic Empiricism: A Reply to Messrs. Lovejoy and Hook: VICTOR LOWE 100

Rejoinder to Mr. Lowe: ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY 111

Not Mindful Enough: SIDNEY HOOK 112

Note on a Not-So-Vicious Intellectualism: HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER 121

Book Reviews 123

I. M. BOCHEŃSKI, *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat):* GEORGE L. KLINE.

ALFRED KASTIL, *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Eine Einführung in seine Lehre:* V. J. MCGILL.

W. K. C. GUTHRIE, *The Greeks and Their Gods:* GLENN R. MORROW.

New Books and Current Journals 139

PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY
BY THE
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND WENDELL T. BUSH

EDITORS: Herbert W. Schneider, John H. Randall, Jr., Ernest Nagel.

MANAGING EDITOR: Emerson Buchanan.

Communications to the editors should be addressed to the Managing Editor, 515 West 116th Street, New York 27, N. Y. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Prince and Lemon Streets, Lancaster, Pa., or 515 West 116th Street, New York 27, N. Y. The annual subcription price (twenty-six numbers) is $5.00. The price of single numbers is 30 cents, double numbers, 60 cents.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., and published fortnightly at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial Office: 515 West 116th St., New York 27, N. Y. President, Ernest Nagel; Vice President, Herbert W. Schneider; Treasurer, Frederick A. Dewey; Secretary, Iris Wilder Dean.

Entered as second class matter, March 18, 1921, at the Post Office at Lancaster, Pa., under Act of Congress of March 3, 1879.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Edited by

MARVIN FARBER

in cooperation with

A DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF AMERICAN AND FOREIGN SCHOLARS

This publication represents no special school or sect. Its aim is to maintain philosophy in the ancient sense, as an exact, descriptive discipline, at the same time bringing it to bear on the problems of the modern world. Space is provided for contributions representing philosophical tendencies in all countries. A series of translations of Russian articles on philosophy and psychology was inaugurated in December, 1944, and is being continued. The journal's significance for the various fields of scholarship makes it of interest to a wide reading public.

Published by the
UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO
Buffalo 14, New York

Subscription price: Five Dollars per year

A descriptive circular listing the main contents of each number since the journal's foundation in September, 1940, may be obtained upon request.

VOLUME XLIX, No. 4 FEBRUARY 14, 1952

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ON A SUPPOSED RESURGENCE OF VICIOUS INTELLECTUALISM

IN the issue of this JOURNAL for July 5, 1951, Professor Victor Lowe reports his discovery of a sort of epidemic error which he finds infecting the mental processes of a number of his professional colleagues, to which he gives the alarming name of "A Resurgence of 'Vicious Intellectualism.'"[1] He not only identifies the error but also offers a psychological, or psycho-pathological, explanation of its genesis. The error consists in "an unreflective use of what appears to be empirical argument but is at bottom argument from definitions to necessary conclusions about questions of fact." And the psychological explanation is that the persons infected—doubtless respectable reasoners on other matters—have been overcome by their "excitement over the Communist threat." Their "embattled souls" sought a "short-cut" to the conclusion that members of the Communist Party should be excluded from university faculties. Such a short-cut seemed to be provided by the above-mentioned type of argument from a definition to a matter of fact; and their emotional eagerness to justify their conclusion has blinded them to the fallaciousness of the argument. It is this particular and purely logical aberration that Mr. Lowe, as a fellow-philosopher, is benevolently concerned to point out and correct; he is apparently not seeking to show that Communist Party members should be freely and unquestioningly admitted to university faculties, and with the purposes of that party, *as* a party, he has no sympathy.

While it is not clear how numerous Mr. Lowe believes the philosophers who fall into this error to be, he mentions three by name, of whom I am one. Since, however, he has given a singularly—though, I am sure, unintentionally—misleading account of my reasoning in the article to which he refers,[2] and since I should be exceedingly sorry to have anyone suppose me capable of arguing "from definitions to necessary conclusions about questions of fact,"

[1] Victor Lowe, "A Resurgence of 'Vicious Intellectualism,'" this JOURNAL, Vol. XLVIII (1951), pp. 435–447.

[2] "Communism *versus* Academic Freedom," *The American Scholar*, Vol. 18, Summer, 1949, pp. 332–337.

I venture to ask for space in which to point out to the readers of this JOURNAL—who constitute a class probably not co-extensive with the readers of *The American Scholar*—that Mr. Lowe has attributed to me a mode of argument which, in the article in question, I carefully and expressly avoided.

I am supposed by Mr. Lowe to reason in this manner:

> "(a) Professor *X* is a Communist;
> (b) A Communist [by definition] has no respect for freedom of inquiry or for objectivity in teaching; to put it positively, he indoctrinates for the party line and the Soviet dictatorship;
> (c) Therefore *X* is not fit to be a professor." [P. 438.]

Mr. Lowe agrees that proposition (b) is true—i.e., is a correct definition—of the consistent or "perfect" Communist. Consequently, "subject . . . to no substantial qualification, we have here a valid argument for excluding the perfect Party member from university faculties." But before excluding any *individual* party member, university authorities should first seek to make sure that he is in fact a "perfect" one; for (Mr. Lowe observes) it is possible that he may be an imperfect one, and therefore proposition (b) may not be true of him. He may not fit the definition. This possibility Mr. Lowe implies that I have disregarded. On the contrary, in the article to which he refers, I explicitly recognized and insisted upon it: "There are, I suppose, some members of the party who will protest that they do not desire, and would not, even if they had the power, introduce here the authoritarian system of one-party government which exists in the Soviet Union, with its negation of both academic and political freedom"; and I noted that there is some reason to believe that at least two of the teachers dismissed at the University of Washington were "Communists of this unorthodox sort." In such cases, I pointed out, it was essential in a judicial hearing to put individually to those accused four "crucial questions" which, if answered truthfully, would have "elicited their actual positions." Since the questions, so far as the record shows, were not put, and since, therefore, I could not know what answers would be given to them by these teachers, I concluded: "I cannot express an opinion about the propriety of the action taken with respect to them by the University." This manifestly was *not* an "argument from definitions to necessary conclusions about questions of fact"; it was an argument that from the *sole* fact that certain persons were admittedly "Communist Party Members," *no* necessary conclusion could be drawn about those particular persons with respect to their "actual positions" on the particular and

crucial issue to be determined—that relating to their acceptance of the principles of freedom and "objectivity" in teaching. I can account for Mr. Lowe's completely inverted account of my reasoning only upon the supposition that—as sometimes happens to physicians—he has himself become infected with the malady he seeks to cure in others; for his own reasoning seems to run as follows: Lovejoy is an "exclusionist"; an exclusionist is (by Lowe's definition) one who argues from definitions to necessary conclusions about matters of fact; *ergo,* Lovejoy does so. By this lapse into "vicious intellectualism" Mr. Lowe has actually been prevented from seeing what I had plainly said.

The real argument for exclusion, which I set forth at length, may be here recapitulated in three propositions, none of them a "definition." The first is a proposition of principle: (1) Freedom of inquiry and of teaching in his own field is essential to the proper exercise of the scholar's function; "society is not getting from him the particular service which is the principal *raison d'être* of his calling unless it gets from him his honest report of what *he* finds, or believes, to be true, after careful study of the problems with which he deals." (2) The second proposition is: The political (as distinct from the economic and social) program of the Communist Party is the establishment of a one-party dictatorship which does not permit freedom of inquiry, of opinion, and of teaching either in or outside of universities; in it the party executive claims and (where it is in power) exercises the right to dictate to scholars what conclusions they must accept, or at least profess to accept, even on matters lying within their own specialties. This proposition is not a "definition" of the "perfect" Communist; it is a statement of fact, verified by an immense mass of evidence, about the actual program and practice of the *party.* The third proposition is: Any individual member of the Communist Party is therefore, *eo ipso,* contributing—by his example, his reputation or prestige (if any), his influence, his utterances, private or public, his votes and his pecuniary aid—to the triumph of a world-wide organization "which has already destroyed the freedom of universities wherever it has attained its objectives, and must be expected to do so wherever it may attain them in the future." This, again, is no "definition"; it also is a statement of an obvious empirical fact. Some individual members of the party may be so ill-informed that they do not know what ends they *are* helping to promote; it is none the less certain that they *are* helping in the far-flung campaign of the most aggressive and formidable contemporary conspiracy against the freedom of the human mind.

It was because of this possibility that there may be some university teachers in the party who are not yet aware of this fact that I urged that they should each be asked expressly whether they *were* aware of it, and if they hitherto had not been, should have it pointed out to them. They were to be asked, in short, whether or not they reject the program of a one-party dictatorship in which both academic and political freedom are suppressed, and also whether or not they reject "the teaching of Lenin (still to be found in current party publications) that a party member should, when it will serve the interest of the movement, resort to 'any ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, and concealment of the truth.'" My opinion was, and is, that any person who does not reject these two principles is unfit to be a member of a university faculty. And since these principles *are* the principles of the party, and are the only principles of the party which relate specifically to the two primary requisites of the academic profession, I held (and hold) that—once a member of the party has been made aware of the fact that the party is, in its aims and its practice, the open and aggressive enemy of freedom and objectivity of inquiry, opinion, and speech—"the only convincing evidence that [he] does not share those aims would be resignation from the Party and abstention from any assistance to it." Continuance of his membership, under these circumstances, would be a plain declaration of his intention to promote those aims. It is not a question of "guilt by association"; it is a question of guilt by voluntary coöperation.[3]

But what (it may be asked) of those who—even when reminded of the fact, and of the evidence for it—deny that the Communist Party *is* committed to the suppression of intellectual freedom and

[3] The phrase "guilt by association" is an obvious verbal trick, since the word "association" is in the last degree equivocal; it may signify any sort of social contact, from occasional meeting, or sharing desks in the same office, to collaboration in some organization for the purpose of realizing a common objective, political or other. One may "associate" with Communist Party members (as I myself have sometimes done) in the hope of convincing them of their errors. It is a pure libel, masked by an equivocation, to say that anyone who would exclude party Communists from university faculties believes in "the determination of guilt by association." What he asserts is that members of that party are *collaborating* with an organization which demonstrably seeks to destroy academic freedom wherever it can, and has already succeeded in doing so throughout a large part of the civilized world; and that such collaboration is an act of disloyalty to the first and fundamental obligation of the scholar's profession. Yet a committee of the American Association of University Professors has caught up the trick phrase (I don't know who invented it) and by means of it has misrepresented the position, on this issue, of a number of its members. And this pronouncement Mr. Lowe finds "entirely sound"!

also inculcates the duty of resorting, where the party's interest requires, to "any unlawful method, evasion, and concealment of the truth," etc.? I answer that their denial is conclusive evidence that, on a matter of grave professional and general concern, they are either declaring a proposition to be false without any serious examination of the clear and copious evidence that shows it to be true (as Mr. Lowe agrees), or else that they are themselves engaged in "evasion and concealment of the truth." It is not necessary to determine, in any individual case, which of these alternatives is the correct one, for either is sufficient evidence of unfitness for membership in a professional body of investigators and teachers. You can not demand infallibility of members of university faculties; you can and should demand that, before giving out pronouncements on momentous issues, they should acquaint themselves with the relevant and (at least) the easily accessible facts, and should not knowingly falsify the facts. But anyone who tells us that the Communist Party is innocent of hostility to academic and political freedom and to scientific objectivity may be fairly likened to a former member of the Nazi party who should maintain that that party and its Leader were innocent of anti-Semitism—or a member of the Ku Klux Klan in the South who should aver that that organization is really agitating for racial equality. The first of the three allegations is no less completely and patently contrary to the evidence than would be the second and third.

This, then, is the logic of "the main argument for exclusion," already more fully presented by me elsewhere. That logic Mr. Lowe has wholly, however unconsciously, misrepresented. The purpose of the present paper is merely to correct that misrepresentation. There are some other features of Mr. Lowe's article which seem to me to call for critical comment, but I must not here take the space necessary for such comment.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

MINDLESS EMPIRICISM

WITTGENSTEIN is reported to have asked his students to check their umbrellas but not their common sense in entering the classroom. In philosophy, of course, common sense is not a sufficient guide, particularly in the absence of relevant knowledge. In the analysis of philosophical problems what we require is uncommon sense. But the point of Wittgenstein's observation is that uncommon sense is not the opposite of common sense, and that we

should look hard at any theory which leads to conclusions that contradict the reasonable judgments of sensible men in ordinary life situations. Such a theory may be a species of what Broad somewhere calls "silly" philosophies like solipsism which no one believes in, or defends, outside the classroom, although this does not exonerate us from the necessity of analyzing the strength and weaknesses of the arguments for them.

These observations are suggested to me by Professor Lowe's article,[1] in which, together with Professors Lovejoy, Smith, and unnamed others, I am charged with the philosophical error of rationalism, i.e., "argument from definitions to necessary conclusions about questions of fact" (p. 438), in connection with my discussion of Communist Party members in the field of education. According to Lowe, I have been arguing from the conception of how a "perfect" Communist Party member is supposed to behave to the conclusion that each and every flesh and blood Communist will actually so behave, overlooking the fact that perfect Communists are Platonic entities and that real people are not merely members of the Communist Party but have varied traits. Consequently, no valid judgment can be made about the behavior of Communist Party members in any situation without specific examination in each case of specific individual behavior. What is true of members of the Communist Party is true of members of any other party or group. Nothing reliable about individuals can be predicted from membership "as such" in a group because the each-form of existence is always something more or less than the all-form imputed in the class characterization.

What I shall show is that Lowe's charge is false and that his position is fundamentally confused in that he mistakes (a) the relation between a generalization about a class and particular members of that class, for (b) the relation between a reasonable *policy* towards members of the class and the valid generalizations about the class. Since the gravamen of Lowe's strictures is that a methodological fallacy has been committed, which presumably makes the issue *philosophically* relevant, I restrict myself here to this question. Evidence for the validity of the generalizations about the Communist Party will be found in the course of my discussions of policy toward Communist teachers cited below, together with a treatment of related political issues.[2]

[1] "A Resurgence of 'Vicious Intellectualism,'" this JOURNAL, Vol. XLVIII (1951), pp. 435–447.

[2] Cf. (a) *New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 27, 1949; (b) *Saturday Evening Post*, Sept. 10, 1949; (c) *Commentary*, October and December 1949; (d) *The Journal of Higher Education*, November 1949; (e) *New Leader*, May

I

The question whether members of the Communist Party should be permitted to teach is not one of fact but of *policy*. Those who, like the individuals criticized by Lowe, maintain that Communists should be excluded from the academic profession, neither assert not imply that each and every member of the Communist Party necessarily acts alike in every particular. They do not deny that Communists may vary in certain respects among themselves. What they maintain, on the available evidence, is that the common act of membership, whose nature is profoundly different from membership in most other political parties, is sufficient to justify us in regarding them as *untrustworthy*, and therefore unfit to teach. This in turn *may be* sufficient, and sometimes *is* sufficient, to bar them from teaching positions or any other positions of important trust.

Such a policy makes no claim to certainties of any kind. It holds that once membership has been established, and we shall always mean *present* membership, then unless relevant countervailing generalizations are introduced, it is reasonable to apply the rule on the basis of our knowledge (reliable generalizations) of the behavior of the Communist Party in this and other countries. The rule may be justified even if in some particular cases we allow exceptions to its application. Lowe, on the other hand, believes that it is "vicious intellectualism" and worse to proceed in any other way than to establish for each member of the Communist Party that he specifically has carried out his party instructions to subvert the educational process. The grounds for believing members of the Communist Party to be untrustworthy must be established in each case by showing that the individual has actually violated his trust. This must always consist of proving something more than that he is a member of the Communist Party. Otherwise, says Lowe, we are assuming he is a pure Communist and nothing but a Communist.

6, 1950; (f) *School and Society*, Jan. 20, 1951; (g) *Socialist Call*, Jan. 27, 1951. The titles of these articles in some cases are not my own but the editors'.

I have cited my various writings on this subject because a perusal of them will show that Lowe is inaccurate in reporting my position, which is that membership in the Communist Party establishes only a *prima facie*, not a compelling case, at all times and circumstances against educational employability. But this does not affect his main charge.

For additional material on the activities of Communist Party cells on campuses, cf. also *Legislative Document* (1942), No. 49, "Report of the Subcommittee Relative to the Public Educational System of the City of New York," esp. pp. 265 ff., 261, 167, 161 ff., 127 ff.

What Lowe ignores is that the argument for a policy of exclusion of Communist Party teachers rests not on the specific behavior of this specific Communist here and now but on the weight we should give to various kinds of evidence we possess about the clearly expressed intentions of this party and its related activities—past and threatened. A man who joins a group of assassins is not always an assassin. But if I know he is a member of such a group, and know the purposes of the group, am I not justified in denying him—I do not say his freedom or his life—but access to a position in which he has a good chance to kill me? One may be killed by an imperfect assassin.

The difference between the "vicious intellectualist" argument and the intelligent empiricist one may be made apparent by counterposing Lowe's formulation to the argument of which it is a caricature. He writes:

> The most frequent argument for his exclusion from the teaching profession runs: Professor *X* is a Communist; a Communist has no respect for freedom of inquiry or for objectivity in teaching; to put it positively, he indoctrinates for the party line and the Soviet dictatorship; therefore *X* is not fit to be a professor. The logical subject of the second premise is the perfect or complete Communist, while the victim of the conclusion is Professor *X*. [*Loc. cit.*, p. 438.]

The actual argument reads:

> Professor *X* is a Communist. Communists are voluntary members of an organization which gives them explicit instructions to indoctrinate, lie, and commit perjury, if necessary, and to act always in the interests of the Soviet Union. We also know that Communists have been convicted of perjury again and again, that they organize secretly, and act in manifold ways unbecoming intellectually honest men. Therefore we are justified in refusing *X* access to a post which requires moral and intellectual integrity.

Note carefully that the argument does not assume that Professor *X* is a "perfect or complete" Communist. Nor does the Communist Party assume this. Its instructions hold for ordinary mortals. Not even Stalin is a perfect or complete Communist, although sufficiently untrustworthy as an imperfect and incomplete one.

Lowe's confusion between the relation of specific fact to generalization and the relation of policy to specific fact is quite general and extends to natural as well as human affairs. "It would be an obvious instance of vicious intellectualism," he writes, "to say that what flows from the faucet can not contain chlorine because *we know* that water is H_2O. But we do not hesitate to say that the man who holds a party card can not be other than a pure propagandist" (*loc. cit.*, p. 444, Lowe's italics).

Of course water may contain chlorine, but if I am looking for a disinfectant shall I go to the water tap instead of the medicine cabinet on the chance that water *may* contain chlorine? If I need gasoline, should I pour water into my tank on the ground that it is not purely water, or only water, and that it may even contain a tincture of gasoline? Of course, no one is a pure propagandist, or only a propagandist, but the question is: should I hire or retain a man, if I do *not* want a propagandist, who is a member of a group which instructs him to propagandize and commit other actions incompatible with his duties as a teacher?

Lowe shakes his head sadly over the defection from empiricism of those he criticizes. But all he has established is that they wish to use relevant knowledge and experience in making decisions of policy, and to render his own empiricism suspect. Empiricism is not going from case to case—*von Fall zu Fall* as the Germans suggestively put it—but learning from a case, in the light of some general knowledge, what is probably true of other cases *before* experiencing them, and arranging our actions accordingly. The function of knowledge is in part to avoid unpleasant surprises in the world, and to do so we have to learn from the experiences of others as much as, if not more than, from our own. Because we can not be certain that a generalization which we have good reason to believe true for a kind is true for any particular instance of that kind, it does not follow that we are without justification for treating the instance on the basis of the knowledge we already have *without the necessity of further investigation of the instance.* To assume otherwise is to be guilty of what may be called the converse fallacy of vicious intellectualism: because any two instances of a kind differ in some respect, it is never reasonable to assume that a particular instance will exhibit the generic trait of the kind. If this is empiricism, it would be hard to find any empiricists among reasonable men—or even among living men, for they all would have died off because of avoidable mishaps in this dangerous world. It is one thing to say: Marsh water into which sewage empties is usually polluted; this is marsh water; therefore it certainly is polluted and should not be drunk—which is what Lowe accuses those whom he criticizes of saying. It is quite another to say: Marsh water into which sewage enters is usually polluted; this is marsh water; therefore it is reasonable not to drink it. This is what they are actually saying, with the addendum that if, out of theoretical curiosity, we wish to find out whether any particular specimen is polluted, it is not necessary to take it (read Communist Party teachers) into our system (read school).

I am aware that "the behavior of humans is not so uniform as that of sticks and stones"; but in certain contexts the behavior of humans, despite differences, shows reliable uniformities, and in *political* contexts, as Communists understand that word, the behavior of members of the Communist Party, despite *their* differences, is more uniform than the behavior of members of non-totalitarian political parties. However, Lowe gives his argument a completely general form by claiming that any policy towards specific individuals based on knowledge of their membership in a class *as such* is "vicious intellectualism." I shall now consider a crucial case in which policy is based on the type of procedure denounced by Lowe as "vicious," as not "civilized [or] open-minded," but which all, save those who are sympathetic to Soviet Communism, would regard as sensible.

Should members of the Communist Party *as such* be barred from access to restricted data in atomic energy plants? There is not a single argument used by Lowe which does not equally apply to this situation. No one is a "perfect" Communist. Because the Party expects its members to engage in espionage and sabotage, if they are strategically placed, it does not follow that this particular member "will follow its instructions perfectly." Judge him by his behavior as a particular person, just like everyone else, not by what his party stands for. If he is found guilty of espionage or sabotage exclude him; but it is vicious intellectualism to exclude him on the ground of his membership as such, for this would be "to predict a man's behavior from his isms and his party [and] forget the great fact of human variation."

Indeed, since fewer Communist members are likely to engage in espionage than to violate their academic trust, and since the punishment for espionage may be imprisonment and death but for academic subversion only dismissal, there is even a stronger case on Lowe's logic for *not* barring members of the Communist Party as such from restricted atomic data than for *not* barring them from teaching.

Nonetheless, every sensible person would regard a conclusion that Communist Party members as such should not be barred from access to these data, as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the position from which it was drawn. Nor are we arguing in *a priori* fashion when we bar Scientist *X* about whom we know nothing more than his membership in the Party. For we know from the evidence revealed in the report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Communist espionage, in the writings of Alexander Foote and Walter Krivitsky, and in the Fuchs and other cases, that the local Com-

munist Parties are chiefly responsible for the amazing successes of Soviet espionage, and that every member of the Communist Party in a strategic position is carefully appraised for his potentialities as an espionage agent.[3]

But even without this particular evidence, there was the record of instructions by the Kremlin to affiliated Communist Parties throughout the world, spelled out in the most explicit way, to infiltrate into key positions in trade-unions, government bureaus, army, police, and other social and cultural institutions. Together with other evidence of Communist Party directives and activities, its encouragement of perjury in the party cause when under investigation, all this would have been sufficient in the eyes of an intelligent democrat to bar members of the Communist Party as such from some types of employment before some of them were caught. Whenever such a policy is adopted, no judgment is passed on how close to, or far from, perfection any particular member of the Communist Party is whom that policy affects. What is being said, and it requires considerable philosophical sophistication not to see it, is that it is unsafe to trust him, unwise needlessly to take chances on him.

The justification of a policy rests not only on its supporting generalizations but on the purpose to which it is oriented. Without reference to purpose we can not tell which among an indefinite number of true generalizations to select and weigh. *The purpose of barring members of the Communist Party from certain kinds of employment is not punishment for acts committed but prevention of acts threatened.* Lowe overlooks this and disastrously misunderstands the position of those criticized. He seems to believe that barring an individual from a post on grounds of his membership in the Communist Party is like convicting him of a crime or imprisoning him without a fair trial. Such a suggestion is preposterous, if we remember that the actual purpose of the policy is merely to prevent him from carrying out his instructions by depriving him of the opportunity to do so. Fair rules of evidence apply of course to determining whether an individual *is* a member of the Communist Party. But the moral responsibility for his action in joining and *remaining* in an organization of this character is his alone. That is why, when the consequences of refusing employment to a Communist Party member or dismissing him are experi-

[3] I have discussed the mechanism of Soviet espionage and its ideological motivation in the *Sunday Times Magazine* of November 26, 1950. Foote was one of the leading figures in the key Soviet espionage ring in Europe during World War II; Krivitsky was Chief of Soviet Intelligence in Europe before World War II.

enced as punishment, they cannot justly be interpreted as deliberate imposition of punishment for a specific offence for which the individual has been neither charged nor tried. If a man intends to make his living by joining a gang of card-sharpers, pledged to deceit without exposing themselves, my refusal to play with him based on my knowledge of his membership *as such* may result in economic hardship for him. But unless he studied philosophy, he is not likely to accuse me of vicious intellectualism because there are card-sharpers and card-sharpers, none of them perfect, and because, until I catch him in the act of cheating, I can not know that he *will* cheat merely on the ground of his intention.

II

I believe it is fairly clear that a reasonable *policy* can be based on membership *as such* in some situations without being guilty of the uncivilized, categorized, and un-openminded thinking which marks the vicious rationalism that Lowe fears so much. Teaching and research in schools obviously pose different situations from filling sensitive posts in government, although in places the problems they involve overlap. What may be a justified policy in the first type of situation may not be so in the second. That will depend upon the series of valid generalizations relevant to the class which is affected by the policy, the relative weights we give them, and the purposes the policy is designed to achieve—none of which Lowe seriously considers.

Those who argue for exclusion usually have as their purpose the prevention of educational subversion; they give primary weight to the generalization, based on a stupendous mass of evidence, both of commitment and behavior, that members of the Communist Party are untrustworthy; and they assume that countervailing considerations do not outweigh the primary one. Lowe could have done any one of three things to contest their conclusion in a responsible way: deny the purpose, contest the primary generalization by examining the main points of the evidence,[4] present countervailing

[4] Some of this evidence, as it bears both on commitment and behavior in schools and research, will be found in footnote 2(a) above (although Lowe professes not to find any reference to behavior in the article). Much more will be found in 2(b). I have explained in 2(f) why specific cases of classroom indoctrination are hard to establish, but for evidence of a Communist Party cell meeting to discuss the most effective ways of indoctrinating Communism in the classroom, see p. 265 of *Legislative Document* (1942), No. 49, of the State of New York. Lowe's familiarity with Communist Party literature may be gauged from the fact that in a passing reference to the generalization about Communists as indoctrinators and propagandists, he says

considerations of greater weight. He does none of these things but instead introduces a red herring about alleged "vicious intellectualism" and maintains that the policy of exclusion is never justified without an examination of the teaching, research, and actual behavior of the specific individual. He will not even allow that a commitment to unprofessional behavior has been made by members of the Communist Party unless we follow this procedure. He differentiates between what he miscalls the "*a priori* exclusion argument" and "the moral argument from incompatible commitments." But since he also asserts that "without examining his teaching and research" we can not be reasonably certain about an individual's commitments, the difference between the two arguments collapses. All reasonable judgments about commitment would be *ex post facto*. Normally, however, we distinguish between the acts which are evidence of a commitment (e.g., joining a party which is dedicated to a certain program, getting married, enlisting) and the acts which are evidence of fulfillment of the commitment.

Given what is already known about the program, organizational structure, and conspiratorial activities of the Communist Party, and the *selective* character of its membership, we have sufficient warrant, *if this were the only generalization relevant,* not for a conclusion about the specific activities of any specific member, but for a policy of exclusion towards members of the Communist Party as such who wish to occupy posts as teachers and scholars which involve a public and/or professional trust. They are, in short, bad educational risks even if none of them is a "perfect" or "complete" Communist, and even if the harm they can do in schools is much less than in atomic energy plants. In one place Lowe admits, on the basis of the few empirical facts known to him, that the following prediction is warranted: "If a university president has a good number of Communists on his faculty, he *should not be sur-*

it is usually drawn from "Lenin's exhortations to the Bolsheviks of Czarist Russia." Although he is prepared to believe the generalization, which he accepts without citing specific evidence, his words suggest that we are dealing with something far away and long ago, and with conspiracy against autocracy, which a democrat regards as justifiable. The truth is that the relevant writings of Lenin giving directives for conspiratorial infiltration were *not* addressed to the Bolsheviks of Czarist Russia. They were post-October, written when the Bolsheviks were in power. They were *not* addressed to Russian Bolsheviks at all but to Communists abroad, including the United States and other democratic countries. (Cf. Lenin's *Selected Works,* English trans., Vol. 10, esp. 95.) Further, the specific instructions to American Communists to indoctrinate in the classrooms are found in the official literature of the American Communist Party. (Cf. 2(a) and (b) above.)

prised if he discovers that many of them propagandize on occasion, and some enough to make it his duty to dismiss them" (*loc. cit.*, p. 442, Lowe's italics). But one of the purposes of knowledge is to avoid unpleasant surprises. Why should any president or faculty representative hire Communists if he knows that with every appointment he increases the probability that he is going to be unpleasantly surprised? Sufficient unto the day are the unpleasant surprises thereof! Why invite more?

Were a policy of exclusion to be carried out, members of the Communist Party would be deprived of certain professional privileges, not rights of citizenship. Since neither teaching, nor the breach of trust in joining an organization dedicated to subverting teaching, is a civil right, no injustice is done in proclaiming the policy and intelligently applying it. The moral issue is primarily one of *professional*, not political, ethics.

In one of the previous paragraphs in referring to what is known about the program and past activities of the Communist Party, the generalization of primary weight, I italicized the phrase *"if this were the only generalization relevant."* It may not be. The warrantability of a policy may depend on other generalizations, some theoretical and some practical, although Lowe dismisses practical questions rather contemptuously. For example, if we are formulating a policy toward Communist Party members in 1951, then we must consider the psychological evidence which makes it much more probable that they are hardened conspirators prepared to carry out their assignments than might have been the case in some earlier year because (a) Communist directives for thought control (Tito, Lysenko, etc.) are intellectually more preposterous and Communist atrocities morally more abominable than ever before, (b) the social penalties of membership are greater, and (c) they have survived the discipline of repeated doctrinal revisions and periodic purges. In other words, we would be dealing with a more dangerous crew in 1951 than in some other year. The times might be more dangerous, too. This would bear on the weight given to certain generalizations derived from the evidence. For example, the fact that the Communist Party proclaims its intention to convert every "imperialist" war (i.e., any war in which the Soviet Union or its satellites are involved) into a civil war, that Communist cells on campuses have distributed literature to students urging them to convert such wars into civil wars against their own government,[8]

[8] I quote from a Communist Party cell paper on a large metropolitan campus: "The Communist Party, therefore, believes in fighting imperialist war before it begins; if it begins (and unless the anti-war forces are not strong enough it will begin) then the Communist Party will organize oppo-

would be given more weight in times of armed conflict than in times of peace.

On the other hand, there may be evidence to warrant the generalization that an attempt to rid our schools of Communists would get out of hand, that the McCarthys would take over and ride herd against non-Communists, that in the absence of faculty action, the intervention of the state would establish a bad precedent, that the risk of doing nothing, even if it invites legislative action, is less than the risk of suffering Communist Party members to teach the young. These and similar generalizations would bear on the formulation of a wise policy.

Whatever decision is reached, it does not require the "binding" methodological and moral obligation to judge the specific classroom behavior of any specific individual, as Lowe insists, for that is not the issue when *policy* is being discussed, any more than the specific behavior of any particular party member in an atomic research laboratory is relevant in deciding the question whether to bar Communists as such from the plant. Who would argue that Pontecorvo had to be found guilty of espionage before we would be justified in barring him from atomic research laboratories once it was known that he was a Communist Party member? Certainly, "two of the prime achievements of democracy are the establishment of the principle that an accused person has a right to a hearing on the charge made against him, and recognition of the obligation, which that entails, to search out and present all the evidence relevant to the charge." But the charge is *not* that *X* behaved in such and such a way but that he is a party member. On *this* charge he is entitled to a hearing, full investigation, and all civil rights. But if membership is established or admitted, investigation of classroom behavior is not required although for certain purposes we may engage in it. But it is patently absurd to assert, as Lowe does, that if I act on the proof that a person is a member of the Communist Party, I am denying that "persons who are Communists are persons." Nor are the cultivated accents of horror with which he denounces philosophers who differ with him on a complex issue, as intolerant and guilty of uncivilized thinking, calculated to further its resolution.

If the point of Lowe's truistic remarks about "vicious intel-

sition against the American capitalist class and its state in the form of strikes, demonstrations, general strikes and revolutionary work within the armed forces. The Communist Party will strive to lead the American masses to battle against the American capitalists, who sent them to war, *to turn the imperialist war into a civil war and a proletarian victory.*" *Teacher and Worker*, Vol. I, No. 2. My italics.

lectualism" is that since there are no "essential" or "perfect" members of the Communist Party we should not bar them from schools (for that matter, why from anywhere else, since the logic is the same?) until the case of each individual Communist has been examined and he has been convicted of actually carrying out the instructions given him, then it illustrates a mindless empiricism that may have disastrous consequences. I say "mindless" empiricism because it is actually mindless of what has been painfully learned about Communist behavior in the past. Taken as a guide to action, I know of no policy that would facilitate the Communist Party tactic of infiltration and penetration so well, and help the spread of McCarthyism in public life so much. For so far as I can see, the irresponsible and morally scandalous methods of McCarthy owe whatever public support they have, unfortunately not inconsiderable, to failures to recognize in time certain dangers to American democratic institutions and to act intelligently and effectively in respect to them.

SIDNEY HOOK

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

IN DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUALISTIC EMPIRICISM: A REPLY TO MESSRS. LOVEJOY AND HOOK

"MY present business," I wrote in "A Resurgence of 'Vicious Intellectualism,'"[1] "is not the whole debate over Communist teachers, but a philosophical issue raised by an important part thereof." It seems to me that both Mr. Lovejoy and Mr. Hook, in different ways, forget this. A clear map of the battleground is now the first necessity.

The hypothetical case which I discussed: Professor *X*, who *has done* teaching and research in a *college or university*,[2] is shown, by his own admission or other conclusive evidence, to be a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A. The question: Is his membership, because of what we know about the Party's attitude toward objec-

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. XLVIII, July 5, 1951, pp. 435–447. The reference is to p. 439.

[2] Not, a *school*. I carefully avoided that word, but Mr. Hook uses it repeatedly in the foregoing criticism—perhaps out of habit, since he has dealt with the school-situation as well as the quite different college-situation in various articles. That I suppose Professor *X* to *have taught*, was explicitly indicated at several points in my paper, and implicit throughout, in my insistence that his academic performance be investigated. Here too Mr. Hook has generalized, as if what I wrote was intended to apply equally to hiring and to firing (my view of the difference is explained below).

tive teaching and research, a sufficient ground for dismissing him without examining his performance as a teacher and scholar? The question is just that, no more. It is not, "What, in the present world situation, should be done about such people?" In this year of our Lord 1952, I should no more think of asking American college administrators to keep admitted Communists than to defy gravitation and float in the air. In the *ante-bellum* days of 1949, however, Messrs. Lovejoy and Hook proposed the exclusion of Communist professors on grounds which were not political but educational. The identification and general philosophical validity of the modes of reasoning they used are the only topics of the present discussion.

One who answers, "Yes," to our question about X, may add the nowadays purely theoretical point, "It is conceivable that circumstances will make it imprudent or unwise, in some cases of this type, to carry out this decision." As I noticed (n. 12, p. 442), Mr. Hook says this. It is his distinction (n. 2 in his present paper) between a *prima facie* case and "a compelling case at all times and circumstances." It does not change the fact that he gives—rather emphatically too—an affirmative answer to the question which started my discussion.

Mr. Lovejoy's main argument for an affirmative answer is that the community of scholars ought not to tolerate anyone who *voluntarily assists* a powerful world-wide movement which would destroy academic freedom; "such collaboration is an act of disloyalty." He also advances what appears to be a further argument, concerning principles rather than acts of assistance—specifically, the principle of "a one-party dictatorship in which both academic and political freedom are suppressed" and the principle that a Communist may lie when that serves the Party's interest. Mr. Lovejoy holds that "any person who does not reject these two principles is unfit to be a member of a university faculty." These two arguments are obviously related, and both are plainly moral in character.[3] They present the issue as a question of principle rather than of anticipating academic behavior. To the first, which Mr. Lovejoy calls "the real argument for exclusion," prediction of what X's teaching and

[3] Somewhat different from either of these is a favorite argument of other exclusionists, the moral argument from incompatible commitments, which was the subject of a footnote on p. 439 of my paper. Not wishing to go beyond the arguments defended in this JOURNAL by Mr. Lovejoy and Mr. Hook, I shall not discuss the latter's attack on my footnote (second paragraph of his Sect. II), except to say that (a) with the help of an out-of-context quotation of a phrase, he misinterprets my view; (b) the concept of *commitment* is far from simple—an adequate analysis of it would be a welcome addition to the literature of ethical theory, this concept being not identical with that of obligation.

research would probably be like if he should be retained is as irrelevant as examination of his past teaching and research. Mr. Hook's big argument, however, is predictive throughout. For him, what justifies *X*'s dismissal without examination of his academic performance is the "generalization" that "Communists are bad educational risks."

My paper was explicitly confined to the predictive type of argument[4] against Communist professors. Such argument, I suggested, rests at critical points on the supposition that every Communist will conform in his teaching and research to our definitive conception of *the* Communist. The readiness to make this supposition is what I called "a resurgence of 'vicious intellectualism' "—having taken this term from William James and explained its general meaning in some detail.

I

I regret disputing with Mr. Lovejoy—not only because his adversaries have never had an easy time, but rather because he is an admired colleague and friend; and because, through recently having something to do with preparing a bibliography of his writings, I am especially aware of his many and great contributions to the cause of academic freedom. I fear that our present difference, as he describes it, is partly the result of a misunderstanding which I might have prevented. Mr. Lovejoy's restatement of his reasoning against my "completely inverted account of it" is a restatement of the very arguments concerning Communist professors—the moral arguments—which I did *not* pretend to examine in my paper. Although they have been his chief arguments, he *also* used a predictive argument in his *American Scholar* article; *that* was the basis on which I included him among persons who have fallen into "vicious intellectualism," and the occasion of my only explicit criticism of him (one paragraph on p. 442). Although examination of my paper will show that its language justifies no reader's inference that I was dealing adversely with *all* the arguments employed by Mr. Lovejoy in *The American Scholar*, I am sorry that I did not forestall such inference by saying explicitly that I was dealing with only one of them.

I would now observe that in *The American Scholar* Mr. Lovejoy called his predictive argument "not less conclusive" than his main

[4] Though I did not give it that name, I dealt with prediction, and limited my paper to the frequently heard argument, "*X* is a Communist, therefore a propagandist, therefore unfit to teach or investigate"—which asserts a contrast, too great to be tolerated, between the teaching that is desired and the teaching that may be expected of him.

argument, and that he has not criticized my criticism of it.[5] I might rest the matter here; but I do not want to duck the hard firm reasoning which Mr. Lovejoy has reiterated. Examination of it will bring out the inevitable basic disagreement which, I am afraid, remains after misunderstandings have been cleared away. This reasoning, as he rightly insists, does not fall under my definition of "vicious intellectualism"; yet it embodies, to my mind, an intellectualistic, abstract way of judging human beings. When Mr. Lovejoy calls attention to the fact that he explicitly recognized the existence of Communists who do not conform to type, I ask, What is the manner of this nonconformity which he discussed, and —with his usual scrupulous fairness to persons—insisted must be shown to be only apparent before academic dismissal can be justified? Does it consist in not having behaved, in teaching and research, as orthodox Communists are supposed to behave? That is the nonconformity I was talking about. But Mr. Lovejoy dealt —and still deals—only with an unorthodoxy (from the Communist point of view) in those persons' "principles" concerning the function of the scholar, and in their *conceptions* of the Communist program. Rather than determine their competency by examining their *performance*, Mr. Lovejoy would do it by pointing out the true nature of that program to them, and asking questions to elicit their *positions*.

Here, then, is a methodological question: How much should our judgment of a man be determined by knowledge of the principles which define his position on ultimate questions, and how much by the record of his own daily work? I believe that both should be taken into account, the record first of all. That a man's daily work in his own back yard should count for *nothing*, and those principles for everything, is contrary to common sense, to philosophical empiricism, and to a concrete interpretation of justice.

I am not thinking of a man's general principles as wholly disembodied, unmanifested. Professor *X* pays dues to the Party, and otherwise supports it. Mr. Lovejoy attends to this part of his conduct. But there remains a distinction between the principles, his subscription to which is thus evidenced, and his daily work. The two may present quite a contrast. It is a historical fact that even philosophers have announced, and fought for recognition of,

[5] As an unqualified prediction of what a Communist teacher "may be expected to be in fact, first and last and all the time" (as Mr. Lovejoy put it). This seemed—and still seems—to me to be drawn, with the help of "an ideal, rationalistic psychology," from the delineation of a type. Mr. Lovejoy presented his prediction as a "consequence" of "the fundamental conviction of the Communist" (*American Scholar*, Vol. XVIII, p. 335).

pure self-interest and expediency as the sole principles of morals, and yet been quite altruistic, and anything but servants of expediency, in the conduct of their lives.[6] There is such a thing as judging a man's value too exclusively by his paradoxes and contradictions, patent though these be to others, and irreconcilable save in his fantasy. Are we to say that if a man has been an honest, competent teacher and scholar he becomes incompetent when we discover that his achievement was inconsistent with his adherence to Communism?

It seems to me that Mr. Lovejoy's position entails an artificial and partial answer to the quite difficult question of what, on the whole, taking human beings as the illogical creatures which they are, constitutes acceptance of a principle and rejection of contrary principles. Professor Phillips, at the University of Washington, seems to have acted daily in accordance with principles of academic behavior quite different from the abominable ones of Communism. Would not the Party have stronger evidence that such a man does not accept its principles, than Mr. Lovejoy has for the conclusion that he does not accept "the principles of freedom and objectivity in teaching"?

Though the argument presented in Mr. Lovejoy's fifth paragraph is distinguishable from his argument concerning Professor *X*'s principles, it has a similar defect of omission. We should accept its "three propositions,"[7] which are undeniably true. But the conclusion that the professor *utterly* condemns himself who will not cease contributing, as a Party member, to Communism's work against "the freedom of the human mind," is too moralistic. I will explain my meaning. Disinterested inquiry and teaching by free minds *is* the most important of all educational ideals.[8] *X*

[6] The general point may be otherwise put by noticing that it is quite normal for the principles a man "acts on" to differ from some of those he "subscribes to." There is something to be said for the ornery man who *won't* subscribe to your honorable principles, though he generally acts on them.

[7] And Mr. Lovejoy's emendation of "guilt by association" to "guilt by voluntary cöoperation."

[8] It is not the only one of positive value. Arguments for *X*'s dismissal which rest on the concept of a "free mind" would be better if they took some notice of the fact that almost all minds are considerably unfree and unobjective, and advocated inquiries into the possibilities of putting unfree minds to good educational use. Mr. Lovejoy finds a value in inviting Communists from time to time to speak before students (*American Scholar*, Vol. XVIII, p. 336). Would there not be real value in their listening for a whole term (when public opinion permits) to the solitary member of the History Department who *believes in* the Stalinist version of economic determinism, unobjective though he must be who believes that? Is there no force in Stuart Mill's argument for the utility of free discussion? Incidentally, insistence that professors refrain

injures it—though *he* may think otherwise—with every payment of dues, however small, to the Communist Party; he injures it by subscribing to the Party's principles, and by every act which helps the Party. But he *serves* the ideal with every day of honest teaching and research that he puts in. That too is a fact. The service of academic freedom, like charity, begins at home. Would it not be a reasonable rule to permit an *excellent* record of such service to weigh more than the evil normally done by a professor's membership in the Communist Party? But the important thing is, not to refuse to look at the man's record. That is too much like taking away a physician's license without looking at his record of medical practice—because instead of seeing the light about anti-vivisectionism, he persists in adhering to a powerful anti-vivisection society. It would be better if the physician saw the light. It would be well for members of the academic profession to know and to reject those principles of the major movements and organizations of the present age—the world Communist movement first of all—which make them dangerous enemies of academic freedom and scientific objectivity; and to abstain from any assistance to them. But to take a professor's refusal to do this (with regard to some organization) as *proof* of his unfitness to teach, is a sort of large-canvas rationalism. It sees the big implications so clearly, that it sanctions complete neglect of the immediate value-facts of the man's academic activity.

The afternoons in the laboratory or library, the hours in the classroom—those are the ultimate facts of our professional life. Nothing can substitute for them in reality; or in our thought, if we would judge men as they are. We forget these realities too easily as we become global-minded, conscious of Ahriman and Ormazd. We demand a right position on world issues, extract a declaration of intentions, insist on a public rejection of Evil. What counts is not whether a professor has shown himself honest, but what he says about Communist dishonesty. We think we have *him* before us, when we have only a public statement of part of his philosophy.

II

In judging a man by some of his principles and by the implications of a stand he takes, rather than by the long record of his conduct, Mr. Lovejoy seems to me to be continuing an inadequate,

from all activities which militate against scientific objectivity in their work would sadly depopulate our college and university faculties. The practical question is a question of degree—of how much unobjective enthusiasm may be permitted without jeopardizing the primacy of disinterested inquiry.

however honorable and respected, tradition of moral rationalism. On turning to Mr. Hook, I find that I have to deal, in the main, with a different sort of thing—with a policy that is argued with insufficient attention to moral principles. The argument for it is, that we know enough about Communist Party members as a class to justify the conclusion that no member may be *trusted* as a teacher or scholar. Hence Professor *X* should be dismissed.[9]

Whether you are right in your method of judging that you may or may not trust a man for a given type of position, is a question about the basis for a probable prediction of his behavior therein. No probabilities about him, no ground for judging him. Mr. Hook wants us to remember that he does not claim to know that this professor *will* betray his educational trust; only that there is too much of a probability that he will. Let us also remember that a merely probable prediction is still thoroughly unsound if it is based on a fraction of the available data.

Mr. Hook defends the logic of his judgment that *X* is untrustworthy in the following passage, the key phrase of which he italicized:

> Because we can not be certain that a generalization which we have good reason to believe true for a kind is true for any particular instance of that kind, it does not follow that we are without justification for treating the instance on the basis of the knowledge we already have *without the necessity of further investigation of the instance.*

". . . it does not follow that we are without justification . . ."—this is policy-makers' language for "In spite of your protests on behalf of individual persons, we have *enough* justification, in principle, for treating them as instances of the *C*-kind and so dismissing them from their professions." The question is, Do you? and on what principle?

The "kind," in "Mindless Empiricism," consists of Party members everywhere. Surely logic would have been better served if Mr. Hook had based his judgment of *X*'s trustworthiness as a teacher and scholar on the smaller class composed of Communist teachers in American colleges and universities in recent years—after making a fair survey of our experience with this class. My

[9] Mr. Hook has generally discussed the policy not as an answer to our question about Professor *X*, but as a declaration which the academic profession are urged to adopt without waiting for *X*'s case to arise. This difference in the mode of discussion can not affect the logic of our controversy. If a policy concerning the members of a class is not justifiable when applied to an unspecified member of the class, it is not justifiable at all. At most, the general effect of its emphatic adoption might "justify" it in the eyes of an amoral strategist.

main objection, however, is to disposing of persons as instances. Mr. Hook has explained that he does not think of Professor *X* as an instance of the ideal Communist type, only as an instance of a class, the members of which vary among themselves. But since this variation is not allowed to count, what does the difference come to? If this way of judging persons does not technically fit my definition of "vicious intellectualism," wherein does it pragmatically differ?

The passage I have quoted continues with a denunciation of "the converse fallacy of vicious intellectualism: because any two instances of a kind differ in some respect, it is never reasonable to assume that a particular instance will exhibit the generic trait of the kind." Of course such an assumption is *sufficiently* reasonable for many subject-matters, many respects, and many purposes; but we are not here dealing with bags of marbles. Our question being, how to treat a *person, X,* would it not, when he is before us, and when we *can* further investigate him—his own behavior—, and when we are uncertain how far, *if at all,* an unfavorable generalization about a kind to which *X* belongs applies to *X* himself, would it not be *more* reasonable (and more just!) to make this further investigation than to refuse it and rest content with the generalization?

Mr. Hook, like a true policy-maker, argues that since civil rights are not involved, "no injustice is done in proclaiming the policy [of excluding Communists] and intelligently applying it." Rather a narrow view of the field of justice and injustice! Though *X*'s dismissal is "experienced as punishment," we are told that punishment without trial has not been imposed. Well, suppose that Mr. *Y* has for several years employed Mr. Hook in some—no matter what—position of trust. *Y* comes to him and says, "You must go. I have decided that you are untrustworthy." Mr. Hook naturally says, "Show me wherein I have ever betrayed your trust!" When *Y* retorts, "That makes no difference!" will Mr. Hook not feel ill-used?[10] Suppose *Y* then explains that he is really being quite reasonable: "It's nothing personal. I'm not judging you, any more than anyone else in that group which *you joined.* You see

[10] I had better not put into words Mr. Hook's probable reaction, were *Y* to explain, "If I can not show you, that is because you have been so clever."

As an interesting variation, let *Y* be a college President who believes (this is not far-fetched) that persons "who do not acknowledge God"—atheists, agnostics, materialists—are, though not organized in a political party, as much "all of a kind" as Communists are, and that this kind is untrustworthy. Mr. Hook's long record as a teacher and scholar would avail him nothing, once he had admitted to being a materialist. Perhaps the A.A.U.P. could successfully insist that his record be given some consideration.

that it's a matter of *policy*, don't you? That's why I don't care about your record—whether it's been good or bad—but only about your being one of that crowd." Will this convince Mr. Hook that he is being treated like a human being? Unless *Y* makes it clear that the situation is a very special one, in which the consequences of Mr. Hook's yielding ever so slightly to pressure from his group would be so disastrous that the most honorable of past performances could not outweigh that danger—unless and until *Y* can say something like this, will not Mr. Hook be right in demanding that his record *count for something*? And in thinking that *Y*'s refusal makes *Y*'s act equivalent to punishing him just as if his record *were* bad? This will not be altered by the fact that *Y*'s *purpose* is "not punishment for acts committed but prevention of acts threatened." If only those acts which had punishment for their purpose could be unjust, there would be far less injustice in the world than there unfortunately is.

The positive particular thesis of the empiricism which my opponent calls "mindless" is, that in deciding, by a predictive argument, whether to continue an individual as a teacher, one must be *mindful* of his past performance as a teacher. Mr. Hook tries to reduce this to absurdity by misinterpreting the general thesis which underlies it and then applying that to a special case of the sort I have just mentioned: Are Communists not to be excluded from jobs in atomic energy plants involving access to restricted information? The true general thesis is, that since the activities of human beings show variations from every characterization of a class or type we must, in predicting an individual's behavior from our past experience of a class or type, concede the additional relevance of our particular experience with that individual. But this does not mean, and I never suggested, that we should not also be mindful of other data and of factors of extraordinary danger; nor does my thesis imply any principle, the same for all types of employment, concerning the relative weight to be given the individual datum. Had space been available, I could have mentioned all these things in my paper. I did not anticipate the interpretation that by positively putting something forward I was denying the relevance of other factors, even to situations quite different from the one I dealt with. Since I was reporting a resurgence of "vicious intellectualism," that was thoughtless of me.

My position, as against Mr. Hook's, thus rests on two principles. First, that a probable prediction of an individual's behavior which includes his past behavior in the same or a similar situation among its data will always be more accurate than one which differs from it by not including that datum. I do not see how this can be denied.

Second, that in academic situations this datum claims enough relative importance to be capable of affecting decision for or against a man. All academic practices of appointment, reappointment, promotion, and dismissal are founded on this principle. It is assumed as normal in every walk of life, its suspension being allowed for in special cases—the exception rather than the rule. Mr. Hook should have shown that in judging whether a Communist is sufficiently trustworthy to be a professor we must first of all attend to factors of extraordinary risk, comparable to the risks of catastrophe in judging the trustworthiness of a physicist in an atomic weapons laboratory.

Mr. Hook supposes that the individualistic empiricism I defend condemns us to waiting until trust has actually been betrayed; which he scorns as most unsensible. This strikes the reader as a clincher, because the words lure him into attributing to Communist Professor *X*, as already real and assured, a future Fuchs-like act. Let us compare my position with the logic involved in judging men. I hold that if an individual has had opportunities to betray his trust, but has instead built up a good record, that creates *some* presumption that he is trustworthy. How can you deny this? I hold that this presumption may always be lessened—which does not mean *abolished*—by other factors, of which continuing membership in the Communist Party is one; and, in atomic weapons laboratories, quite outweighed by that very factor. On the other hand, the presumption of trustworthiness is increased by every year of honorable service.[11] Is any of this contrary to common sense? I will add, that if our Communists are just beginning to teach we should expect, half the time, that the available evidence of an objective mind and a trustworthy teacher will not be enough to outweigh the contrary evidence which Mr. Hook calls to our attention. (Of course you must look at your men individually to find that out; Hook won't let you look.) The hiring of such a young man would not normally be justified (though it would more often be justified in some fields than in others). You can call this "obviously inconsistent" with retention of older teachers who are Communists, only if you first take the position that particulars, and quantity of evidence. don't matter, because a Communist is a Communist.

As Mr. Hook is surely not ignorant of the logic of probable prediction from classes to individuals, I cannot help thinking that, though he knows better than to call every Communist a perfect specimen of a type, his reasonings nevertheless covertly rest on a definitive characterization of *the* Communist. Consider. Predic-

[11] Not to be confused with possession of academic tenure, as such.

tion can only be based on past experience. Only definitions have the logical force to override big gaps, deliberately accepted, in this past experience; unless special factors, comparable to those present in an atomic weapons laboratory, make the relevance of that segment of past experience negligible in the cases of some persons. The segment to which I have been calling attention is normally *the primary datum* for prediction of probable behavior.

Mr. Hook has reiterated the point that Communist professors have received official instructions to subvert the educational process. This is fair evidence—his best—against trusting *X*. On p. 441 of my paper, I indicated why it is not overwhelming.[12] Let me add that, in the case under discussion, these instructions have come to a man who would hardly be where he is if he did not have a considerable non-Communist interest in education. Is it not possible—even likely—that on the campus he is inspired by that other interest? You could tell by looking at his performance. But *good* Communists follow the Kremlin's instructions; no need to look at his academic performance. —The type again!

My philosophy is a form of individualism: we should judge an individual first of all (though not exclusively) by *his* record rather than by that of any group, whenever and wherever special circumstances do not make that too dangerous. This is a moral principle. Mr. Hook is altogether too quick to depart from it in the interest of strategy. He takes the situation out of its academic setting, and writes as if it centered in Washington, D. C.; and as if he were there, drawing up policies about groups on the basis of the instructions they get from various high places—safe policies. I am sure that Mr. Hook would not himself defend the eulogy of the *safe man* which is unfortunately implied in his call for the avoidance of unpleasant surprises beyond today's.

In his final paragraph, he leaves the reader to understand that those persons who have not accepted policies like his are to blame for "whatever public support" the methods of McCarthy enjoy. This is fantastically unrealistic. But I must not take up the subject of social causation.[13] My criticism of Mr. Hook is not that he is an "imperfect" strategist. It is that, with respect to college and

[12] Readers of that paper will understand that I accept as *relevant*—but not as *sufficient*—evidence everything that Mr. Hook cites to show that *X* is untrustworthy. I also accept here his view of Communist literature, about which he knows infinitely more than I do. And I am glad to have my "passing reference" to Lenin corrected.

[13] I want, however, to express my conviction that Mr. Hook performed a very great public service when he warned against "The Dangers in 'Cultural Vigilantism,'" in *The New York Times Magazine* for Sept. 30, 1951 (p. 9).

university faculties, he became a strategist and left the individual altogether behind.

Mr. Lovejoy has not done that; but he seems to me to have substituted for the observable individual a sort of "rational animal" who may be truly and adequately known by some of his principles, by that fraction of his conduct in which they are evidenced, and by the logical implications of his positions.

The present subject is obviously one on which there is even less than the usual likelihood of profit from prolonged controversy. Having, I hope, clarified the diverse characters of Mr. Lovejoy's and Mr. Hook's "rationalism," I shall not ask for further space, should either of them wish to continue the argument.

VICTOR LOWE

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

REJOINDER TO MR. LOWE

MR. Lowe, I am happy to find, now expressly acquits me of the charge of "vicious intellectualism" (as defined by him) which he had seemed, to me and other readers, to bring against me in his first article in this series. But he still thinks that my opinion that Communist Party members should be, as such, excluded from university faculties "embodies an intellectualistic, abstract way of judging human beings" (which is bad, but presumably not "vicious"). His reason, or chief reason, for this judgment of *this* human being is contained in his present main argument on the question of exclusion.

That argument relates to a hypothetical and improbable but perhaps not impossible special case: Suppose a Professor *X* who is a known member of the Communist Party and fully accepts and approves its principles and methods, including "lying" (when the party's interest requires) and the suppression of academic freedom. But suppose also that, within his own institution, he has never acted upon nor propagandized for those principles and has done nothing to restrict the intellectual freedom of his local colleagues. Even though his "principles" are (as Mr. Lowe puts it) "abominable," a negation of the basic requirements of the scholar's calling, should he be dismissed when his "conduct" has been, and is, unexceptionable? I answer that helping to maintain the party—by paying dues, by participating in its councils, by pledging himself to obey as a voter the instructions of the party bosses—obviously *is* "conduct" (as Mr. Lowe himself admits). It is conduct aimed at the eventual elimination of academic freedom in America; and it is

collaboration in the present ruthless suppression of such freedom in all the countries, in Europe and Asia, dominated by the Soviet oligarchy. It is true that the hypothetical Professor *X* does not, so to say, soil his hands by personally taking part in the more unpleasant—and in this country, hazardous—activities essential to the realization of the totalitarian objective. He has them done for him by others. But *qui facit per alium facit per se.* He is, then, consciously coöperating in a world-wide organization engaged, among other things, in an effort to destroy freedom of inquiry, of thought, and of teaching, and the intellectual integrity of men of science. This, I submit—whatever be *X*'s "private virtues"—is a violation of professional ethics in its most vital article, and is therefore a valid ground for exclusion from university faculties and professional associations.

Mr. Lowe has, however, another argument. It turns upon the question of predictability. Can it be *predicted* that a party member will, in his own institution, engage in underground intrigue, or espionage, or secret sabotage, or the like, in accordance with the party principles and requirements? Mr. Lowe thinks it can not be; and if it can not be, party membership should, of itself, be no ground for exclusion. Here I answer that it doubtless can not in all cases be predicted with certainty. But it is a question, not of certainty, but of probability. And estimates of probability, based not on definitions but on experience, should, where grave dangers are involved, be the guide of policy. In view of past experience of similar cases, the likelihood that an *X* will be the wholly innocuous creature, on his home grounds, that he is depicted as being, seems to me slight. But I have now used up the brief space allotted to me, and must therefore leave the discussion of this further question in the competent hands of Mr. Hook.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

NOT MINDFUL ENOUGH

I

IN his original article Mr. Lowe argued as if *any* policy based on an inference about membership in a class *as such*, when applied to individuals, was an instance of "vicious intellectualism." His use of illustrations from natural science showed that he was making the argument completely general. All I was concerned to show is that there are situations in which a policy based on this *mode* of

argument is perfectly legitimate. He now admits that there are *some* situations in which this is a reasonable procedure, in which there is nothing intellectually vicious in formulating a policy based on the assumption that despite differences among individuals of a class, particular instances will exhibit the generic trait of the class. He explicitly asserts that "this assumption is *sufficiently* reasonable for many subject-matters, many respects, and many purposes" but denies that it is ever sufficiently reasonable for an educational policy towards Communist Party college teachers.[1]

One would have imagined that an empiricist, before reaching conclusions about a reasonable policy in this connection, would have familiarized himself with the relevant evidence about the Communist Party, how it is organized and how it functions, instead of deducing a policy from general methodological considerations.

Our "subject-matter" is Communist Party members on college campuses and in research laboratories with "respect" to their reliability in fulfillment of their academic trust, in relation to "the purpose" of upholding intellectual integrity and preventing educational subversion.

The very way in which Mr. Lowe poses the question under discussion reveals that he disregards highly relevant evidence. The question about *X*, according to him, is whether "his membership, because of what we know about the Party's attitude toward objective teaching and research, is sufficient ground for dismissing him without examining his performance as teacher and scholar." This

[1] I confess myself puzzled among other things by Mr. Lowe's strictures against my urging a "policy." Is his "rule of action" not a policy? When a general question arises concerning what to do, every answer is a recommendation of policy. As Mr. Lowe is aware, I have never discussed the case of Professor *X* but a policy colleges should follow, urging that they declare publicly, in advance (in the fashion of the New School for Social Research), that membership in any organization like the Communist Party, which instructs its members to commit educationally dishonorable acts, disqualifies a person as a teacher. This may not have a bearing on the methodological issue but certainly not for the reason Lowe gives. For were he to rest his methodological criticism on his claim that: "If the policy concerning the members of a class is not justifiable when applied to an unspecified member of the class, it is not justifiable at all," his case would be irretrievably lost. All of the policies adopted by insurance companies, to mention only one illustration, are based on a precise denial of this statement. And whatever else one may say about insurance, it is reasonable.

More pertinent is the profound bearing the policy recommended has on the moral issue, since it places *responsibility* for the consequences of membership on the person who voluntarily joins or continues in such an organization. He cannot plead ignorance of what is *expected* of him as an excuse. Mr. Lowe, it seems to me, misses the significance of the point. But more of this below.

is inadequate. The form in which I have discussed it—which is presumably the target of his criticism—is this:

In virtue of what we know

(a) about the Party's official instructions *secretly* to indoctrinate, recruit, and propagandize,

(b) about the activities of members of the Communist Party on the campus, in laboratories, and the way they change their tune with every change in the party line,

(c) *about the selective nature of Communist Party membership and the conditions of continued membership,* and

(d) the probable disorganization of the academic community which would result from the attempt to check on classroom indoctrination and other Communist practices,

are we not justified in regarding members of the C.P. as bad educational risks, and proclaiming and enforcing by *faculty* action a policy of exclusion, without *necessarily* waiting until we have the evidence that individual members of the C.P. have actually carried out their instructions? This line of thought I have always coupled with supplementary arguments so that the wisdom of the policy rests on the cumulative weight of several arguments. I restrict myself here only to the argument Lowe criticizes.

I should now insert as (e) in the above argument what I had always taken for granted until I read Mr. Lowe's reply, viz., that if members of the Communist Party were to succeed in their actions, they would be exercising harmful influence on the minds, moral character, and possibly the whole tenor of the lives of students whom they succeeded in enrolling or indoctrinating. I regard Mr. Lowe's statement: "Mr. Hook should have shown that in judging whether a Communist is sufficiently trustworthy to be a professor we must first attend to factors of extraordinary risk comparable to the risks of catastrophe in judging the trustworthiness of a physicist in an atomic weapons laboratory"—as a preposterous request. There are few situations in which any action would have consequences comparable to those of a "Fuchs-like act." Intelligent evaluation of risk must be commensurate to specific positions, purposes, and responsibilities.[2]

[2] As my article shows I was not unmindful of the respective differences in danger that flow from the presence of C. P. members in restricted science projects and in schools. But from the point of view of parents who do not want their sons and daughters (or educators their students) inducted into the Communist Party, or subjected to calculatedly dishonest teaching, or recruited to fight in a Communist battalion, or indoctrinated to a point where they lend themselves to the strategems of a Communist espionage ring, there is educational risk enough. Many illustrations can be given of lives blasted by early

I have italicized (c), which Mr. Lowe completely ignores, because it has an important bearing on the reliability of our judgments about the untrustworthiness of members of the Communist Party. For it is sometimes asked: What reason is there to believe, aside from instructions and past activities of Communists, that official instructions are carried out? The answer is largely provided by (c).

What, then, do we know about the selective nature of Communist Party membership and the conditions of continued membership? As I write I have before me a copy of *Our School and the World,* an anonymously published but widely distributed shop paper by a Communist Party cell issued a few years ago on the campus of a large eastern university. Under the rubric "Communist Literature for the Professor," it asks its readers to judge the Communist Party not by what others say about it but by its own official literature. Let us turn to this literature. "In drawing professionals into the Party," writes Foster, the leader of the Party in its official organ, "care should be taken to select *only* those individuals who show by practical work that they definitely understand the Party line, are prepared to put it into effect, and *especially* display a thorough readiness to accept Party discipline."[3] What this means is made clear in a Resolution of the Ninth Convention of the C.P.U.S.A.: "All Communists must *at all times* take a position *on every question* that is in line with the policies of the party . . ." (my italics throughout).

We also know that the C.P. weeds its ranks carefully by purge and re-registration and other forms of control. Not everyone who applies for membership is selected. Not everyone is retained after he is selected. The C.P. is not a tea-drinking, merely dues-paying organization. Inactive members are excluded. "Bad" Communists are excluded. There exists a Central Control Commission whose task is to check on all members. In earlier years, before the practice became dangerous to the Party, lists of members dropped for violations of party discipline were published.[4]

Communist indoctrination and enrollment in the Party. Incidentally, it has been established that Communist members of espionage groups have taught in our educational institutions.

[3] "The Communist Party and the Professionals," *The Communist,* September 1938, p. 808. Specific reference is made in the "shop" paper to this article as giving an authentic account of Communist Party theory and practice.

[4] The following exchange between Earl Browder and members of a House Committee is highly instructive on this point:

Mr. Mathews: In numerous instances we have a notation [of the Central Control Commission] that the expelled member "refused to carry out party

We therefore have excellent reasons to believe that "good" Communists follow the party line *not* because—as Lowe would say—"Ah! *the* type again," but because of the verifiable fact that efficient mechanisms operate to exclude those who do not. There is an overwhelming presumption of an empirical kind that a member in *continued* good standing is a good Communist. He may be efficient or inefficient, clever or inept, but he must convince the Party that he is always in there *trying*, in order to remain in the Party. The longer he is in the Party the greater the likelihood his work has been satisfactory to the Party in carrying out directives. There is every reason to have far more confidence in the ability of the Communist Party to detect a "bad" Communist than in the ability of Mr. Lowe or a faculty committee.

We can now give the answer to the question with which Mr. Lowe confronts Mr. Lovejoy: "Would not the Party have stronger evidence that such an [apparently academically honorable] man does not accept its principles, than Mr. Lovejoy has for the conclusion that he does not accept 'the principles of freedom and objectivity in teaching'?" The answer is: No, because if it had the evidence, this man would long since have been read out of the Party, and since he is still in the Party, Mr. Lovejoy is justified in believing him to be carrying on his work.

But since it is not absolutely inconceivable that a member could have deceived the C.P., I have always stressed (d) above. (In passing it should be noted that F.B.I. agents have succeeded in deceiving the C.P. only because in every known case they actually carried out to the full the Party's directives.) Suppose, then, we try to discover whether Professor *X* has been deceiving the Communist Party and will continue to deceive it, so long as he remains on the faculty.

Shall we observe him in class? No one indoctrinates when he is under observation. Students are naturally and rightfully loath to carry tales even if they know what is going on, which is not

> decisions." That is in line with your explanation of the relationship between the Communist Party of the United States and the Comintern?
>
> Mr. Browder: Exactly.
>
> Mr. Mathews: A member must carry out all decisions of the party or be expelled from the party?
>
> The Chairman: Is that correct?
>
> Mr. Browder: Yes, that is correct.
>
> Mr. Starnes: A party member does not have any latitude or discretion in the matter—he has to carry out orders?
>
> Mr. Browder: The party has to carry out orders.
>
> *—Hearings before Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Rep., 76th Congress, First Session on H. Res. 282, Vol. 7, 4417.*

always the case. Shall we encourage them to stoop to the techniques of a police state? The kind of indoctrination Communist teachers are advised to conduct can rarely be detected except by a knowledgeable and critically trained observer who is almost continuously present. The *content* of teaching, its direction, emphasis, and cumulative force as it is slowly built up over a period of time can not be ascertained merely by periodic inspection which enables us to judge certain pedagogical techniques and skills.[5]

So far, then, as "good" conduct of members of the Communist Party on the campus is concerned, we can not evaluate it as we do the conduct of other teachers because the presumption of good faith is lacking and empirical evidence of bad faith is present in virtue of the series of acts which constitute continuing membership. In the face of the extraordinary difficulties of determining when skillful indoctrination is taking place, and in the light of what we know about the conditions of continued membership in the Communist Party and the teacher's *voluntary* affiliation, we are more justified in believing that his activities have probably gone undetected than that he has consistently violated the Party's instructions. *Theoretically,* if we had a vast amount of time and resources at our disposal, it would not be impossible to get to the bottom of things in each case and discover who had been deceiving whom, and will *continue* to deceive. But we haven't the time and resources. And if we had, why should we?—since (i) the teacher is free to resign from the party with whose instructions he disagrees, and since (ii) the processes of continued supervision of Communist Party teachers in the classroom, laboratories, and the quiet hours of library and office conferences Lowe writes about, and the necessarily close interroga-

[5] For these and other reasons I have always argued that the best safeguard against indoctrination and related dishonorable practices is not the foolish requirement of loyalty oaths from teachers but the recruiting of competent men and women sufficiently dedicated to the ideals of teaching and scholarship to recognize that such practices are incompatible with professional integrity. Once we have such teachers we should have implicit faith in them and not snoop around to determine *what* they are teaching as distinct from *how* they are teaching, in the event that friendly visits to help improve instruction at the beginning of their careers is thought necessary.

For some criteria of the good teacher, cf. Chapter IX of my *Education for Modern Man.* I have discussed the problem of the difficulty in detecting indoctrination in *School and Society,* Jan. 20, 1951, some sentences of which I have here adapted. For obvious reasons what we know about C.P. indoctrination usually comes from former members who have been expelled. Sometimes in retrospect students will discover that teachers have been guilty of indoctrination for the party line. For some relevant material, see the University of Chicago textbook of readings, *Let the People Judge,* Vol. 2, p. 713, Chicago, 1949.

tion of students and colleagues to check up on such teachers, would be not only degrading but would poison the atmosphere of any decent academic community.

And now for a final observation on the case of Professor *X*. Mr. Lowe has manufactured a psychological monstrosity to bolster his position. Consider! Here is Professor *X*, a member of the Communist Party, who presumably does not accept any of its directives and has managed to evade searching detention by his comrades. He is academically spotless, a thoroughly "bad Communist." Yet he knows that his continued membership in an organization whose directives he disobeys, and from whose watchdogs he must painfully conceal his honorable conduct, is presumptive evidence of lack of moral and intellectual integrity in the eyes of his colleagues. If discovered it probably will lead to dismissal. Why, then, does he remain in the Party? What masochistic compulsion prevents him from resigning? Why is he not content with the status of a sympathizer? It is so improbable that anyone like Mr. Lowe's *X* exists that it would be taking a foolish risk to assume that he or any party member is as harmless as some of them may conceivably *appear* to be—and as Lowe assumes that some actually are.

The policy of exclusion is based on the assumption that members of the Communist Party are not March hares. Mr. Lowe fails to note that to say we do not *necessarily* have to investigate the actual behavior of each and every member of the Communist Party is not incompatible with allowing for exceptional situations, some of them less desperate and more credible than the one just considered, in which we may wish to do so. One does not have to use a rule like a fanatic—blindly and automatically.

II

This brings me to Mr. Lowe's ethical argument. Most of his points are egregious examples of the fallacy *a dicto simpliciter* which is a more genuine form of "vicious intellectualism" than the thought processes of his opponents. He states certain principles which have general validity and then applies them to a special case marked by special conditions that are ignored in the generally valid formulation. Of course, it is absurd to judge a man, whether for a post or promotion, by his membership in a group (general principle), but not absurd to judge him by his voluntary membership in a group engaged in violating the very presuppositions of the position (special condition). Of course, it is outrageous for a President of a college to dismiss a man merely for his philosophical views (general principle), but not outrageous if he is a member of a

philosophic group organized, if we can imagine such a thing, to function like the Communist Party (special condition). Mr. Lowe here overlooks the crucial difference between heresy and conspiracy. His remarks on objective teaching equally miss the point. Of course, the best teacher despite himself falls short of complete objectivity. But to fail to distinguish such cases from the case of teachers who are instructed deliberately to turn their backs on the ideal of objectivity, to avoid the counter-revolutionary deviation of "objectivism" like the very plague, has as much sense as saying that because many men unwittingly make mistakes in arithmetic there is no moral difference between them and professional short-change artists. We are all fallible creatures. Therefore there is no difference between cheats and honest men!

The same fallacy is strikingly in evidence in the key illustration Mr. Lowe cites to establish how amoral, if not immoral, my position is. Would I not feel ill-used, he asks, were I dismissed from a position of trust by an employer *solely* on the ground that I was a member of my group? I certainly would. But *my* group is not any group, and particularly not like the group for whom the policy is being recommended. To fit *that* group it would have to be described differently and Mr. Lowe's imaginary colloquy correspondingly altered. In that case I would not feel ill-used.

Since in Mr. Lowe's eyes I am an "amoral strategist," I can not expect my feelings to have authority for him on this point. I therefore propose he test the reasonableness of what I say by consulting his own feelings in the situation he describes, once it is properly modified to bring it in line with the problem under discussion. I shall take the liberty of assuming that it is Mr. Lowe who occupies a position of important trust—no matter what—requiring fundamental integrity. Here is the experiment. Suppose his employer discovers that he is a secret member of a well organized conspiracy whose purpose is precisely to betray that trust. Suppose that members of the conspiracy have actually betrayed the similar trust of other employers and that it is known that anyone who does not accept the rigorous discipline of this group is excluded from it. Whereupon Mr. Lowe is discharged. I do not possess Mr. Lowe's literary skill, but following his lead, I imagine the conversation would go something like this:

"Show me wherein I have ever betrayed your trust," protests Mr. Lowe.

"That makes no difference," his employer responds. "You've been simply waiting for your chance! I don't propose to spend time and energy from my business watching you. And for all I know, you've been carrying out the instructions of your gang behind my back."

"On my word I assure you I have never done anything dishonorable in the past, as my record shows," pleads Mr. Lowe.

"If you were an honorable man," comes the retort, "you would never have joined such an organization in the first place or remained when you found out what it was like. The fact that you remained in it during all these years shows that you must have been considered satisfactory by your fellows and done jobs, or tried to do jobs, for them."

"No, sir!" replies Mr. Lowe, "I never took orders from them. I have ways of fooling them. They do not know how good my record is here."

"Neither do I," responds the employer. "Once I thought I knew but not now. But why didn't you tell me when you joined?"

"That's against instructions."

"But you just said you never took instructions."

"Only this one, sir."

"You know perfectly well it's against the rules of the trade (game) to do what your members do. Look at the rule book of the guild! You knew such practices are bad and the penalties."

"Yes, I knew," insists Mr. Lowe, "but my record is spotless and I never, never engaged in such practices. And even if I were some day to betray your trust, surely the consequences of my act would be in no way as disastrous as if I were a successful atomic spy."

"Are you trying to be funny? The consequences for me and my clients would be bad enough. And by the way, isn't it true that some of the members of your own group have been up to their necks in espionage, and for all I know. . . ."

"But isn't my service here to count for something?" Mr. Lowe reiterates.

"You were paid for it and the work was not unenjoyable. And yet to think you were willing to coöperate with that gang! I presume you are through with them if I can hush up your disgraceful action."

"Oh, no," counters Mr. Lowe, "I intend to remain a member."

"Why? Are they holding a member of your family or something like that? No? But you just assured me you don't accept directives from them. If what you say is true, it doesn't make sense; if it isn't true, you can't leave soon enough. In either case, since you knew what the guild expects of people in a position of trust, you have only yourself to blame."

And with this the employer finally terminates the conversation and Mr. Lowe's job. My question is: Would Mr. Lowe feel ill-used? Would anyone else who was free to join or not to join, to leave or remain in this conspiracy? I am willing to regard this situation as paradigmatic for the ethical principles involved.

If space permitted I would show that some of the other methodological principles assumed by Lowe are likewise subject to important amendment in the special situation under discussion. They, too, exemplify the fallacy *a dicto simpliciter*.

A few words in conclusion. The policy which would liberate our colleges from educational conspirators is not motivated by a desire to create conditions for *safe* minds but for *free* minds. Whatever educational stimulus can be provided by fanatics pledged in advance to follow every twist and turn in the Party line from art to zoölogy can be supplied by teachers whose primary loyalty is to the logic and ethics of free inquiry essential to liberal education.

We no more need members of the C.P. to teach Marxist-Leninism or Stalinism competently than we need members of the Ku Klux Klan and Fascist Parties to inquire into the truth about racialism and the Protocols of Zion.

Finally, I have nowhere maintained that popular support of vigilantism, cultural or political, is the result of failure to follow any policy I have advocated but that in considerable measure it is a reaction to the consequences of the *mode* of thinking to be found in Mr. Lowe's original article. The denial that membership in an organization *as such* can be a sufficient ground for exclusion from positions of trust means that until evidence of specific wrongdoing has been produced no justified protective action can ever be taken until the actual harm has been done. Such a policy assumes that the Communist Party is like all other democratic political parties and ignores the fact that it is part of an international conspiracy functioning as a fifth column in every sector of democratic life.

SIDNEY HOOK

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

NOTE ON A NOT-SO-VICIOUS INTELLECTUALISM

THE following comments have no bearing on the preceding discussion, but this discussion affords a convenient occasion for saying in print something familiar to all of us, something noncontroversial, but something which should weigh on the consciences of philosophers especially. I refer to the popular confusion between the use of the term "communist" as applied to current parties, politics, and regimes, and the meaning of "communism" as a traditional philosophical idea.

It may be true that the use of "Communists" to designate a particular group or policy is only a little more than a century old, and that in this context the Marxians can claim the term as a proper name for their revolutionary socialism. But it is certainly true that when the Marxian revolutionaries organized their particular brand of communist ideology, the idea of communal ownership was already an old idea, an idea which had received technical formulation and currency in ancient Greece. "Communism" as a name for an -ism, therefore, certainly deserves to be used by philosophers with some respect for its traditional meaning and ideals.

The Stalinists and Cominform theorists are all agreed and have repeatedly publicized the fact that the Soviet government is not a communist regime, that it is supposed in a vague, though not

"withering-away" process to lead ultimately to communism, and that it is important for the sake of the ideal not to confuse the ideal with the actuality. The military nature of the present dictatorship is the product of an historical situation which was not foreseen by nor compatible with strict Marxism. To identify it even with the Leninist "dictatorship of the proletariat" requires rather free construction of theory and a sardonic sense of humor. Allegiance to the Soviet cause has created an issue which has split the ranks of revolutionary socialism and "fractioned" the American revolutionary parties. The most orthodox (philosophically speaking) communists have failed to follow the "party line" and the Communist Party in the United States is now clearly and frankly neither communist nor a political party. Such a situation is bewildering both intellectually and politically.

Philosophers are certainly not being viciously intellectualist when they use the term "communism" in its traditional sense to signify the abolition of private property. It may be politically unrealistic, journalistically impractical, and ideologically bourgeois to think in terms of utopian communism. On the other hand, communism seems today as much as ever a utopian ideal. As things are going it still seems probable that, if communism is to be tried in practice, it must be tried by small communes in a hostile world. Of course among "guardians" (to use the Platonic term) or armies (to use our own word) communism is an old and disagreeable story. But as a scheme for production, either agricultural or industrial, the radical type of coöperative (no property) production seems to be losing steadily in favor of government management of corporate (or union) owners of property rights. Be this as it may, there is need for a term like "communism" to designate the traditionally radical solution of the distribution of rights and the use of goods; and social philosophers can ill afford to have the term taken away from them to be abused by politicians and journalists. Whether it is practical or not under present circumstances to have a Communist Party in the United States, it is important for anyone who has respect for the history of ideas to know what "communism" means. Though we can not expect those who are engaged in a bitter struggle to cease exploiting the term for their political ends, we who are primarily intellectualists can support each other in using the term intellectually to designate something that does not exist.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

BOOK REVIEWS

Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (*Diamat*). (Sammlung Dalp, Band 69.) I. M. Bocheński. Bern: A. Francke AG. Verlag. 1950. 213 pp. 8.40 s. fr.

Let me say to begin with that Professor Bocheński's book offers the best brief survey of the historical development and present status of dialectical materialism available in any language (including the Russian). Read in conjunction with the more detailed historical sections of Gustavo Wetter's *Materialismo dialettico sovietico* (Turin, 1948), it provides a comprehensive and informed guide to the philosophical doctrines of Russian Marxism.

Bocheński bases his exposition and critique on: (1) the works of Lenin and Stalin (Marx and Engels enter only through the Leninist-Stalinist prism); (2) official Party decrees, the statements of Zhdanov, etc.; (3) semi-official texts such as Yudin and Rozental's *Philosophical Dictionary* (2nd ed., Moscow, 1940), a watered-down English version of which, "edited and adapted" by Howard Selsam, was published in 1949 under the title *Handbook of Philosophy;* (4) the works of leading contemporary Soviet philosophers such at Mitin, Leonov, and Rozental; (5) articles and discussions in the journal *Voprosy filosofii* [*Problems of Philosophy*], which began publication in Moscow in 1947.

On no essential point, Bocheński states, does contemporary dialectical materialism go beyond the Leninist doctrines formulated by Stalin in his *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (1938) and systematically expounded in the *Philosophical Dictionary*—a work which consists almost exclusively of quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, with some historical and factual material on philosophers and philosophies.

Bocheński presents his material in two main sections: a brief historical survey, and a longer, systematic exposition of current doctrines. He first reviews the Western sources of dialectical materialism: eighteenth-century French materialism, nineteenth-century German materialism, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and Engels. He rightly emphasizes that Engels, not Marx, was the founder of *dialectical* materialism. Marx was responsible for the doctrines of *historical* materialism—the Marxist theory of history and society —, but it was Engels, chiefly in his *Anti-Dühring* and in the unfinished posthumous work *Naturdialektik* (first published in Moscow in 1925), who added the speculative, cosmological, and methodological dimension to Marxism. Engels' thought, according to Bocheński, forms the bridge between Marx and Lenin. Since

Lenin, Engels has been quoted much more frequently and extensively by Russian dialectical materialists than has Marx.

In his discussion of the Russian roots of dialectical materialism, Bocheński permits himself one or two questionable generalizations concerning Russian culture and the notorious "Russian soul." Russians, we are told, tend to view everything, especially social problems, on a very large scale, neglecting the concrete and particular. Furthermore, "the subordination of the Church to the State precluded a clearcut division of the religious and secular spheres like that in the West, and furthered the fusion of the two areas. All social institutions thus took on a kind of sanctity. . . . [This] is clearly expressed in Russian revolutionary thought" (p. 30). And, since nineteenth-century Russians were denied opportunities for historical action, they came to view all social and human problems at a high level of abstraction, ignoring facts in favor of theory. Bocheński feels that Russian "messianism" was generated from the intolerable tension between deeply-rooted Christian ideals and the sordid and brutal facts of Russian life, finding expression in an apocalyptic vision of a radical moral and social upheaval through which Russia was to "save" world civilization. This messianism was intensified by misunderstanding, suspicion, and hatred of the West, and a consequent reversion to native values and resources. This withdrawal, in turn, was reinforced by the "mission-conscious Orthodox Church, which kept telling the people that the Latins [Roman Catholics] were profoundly corrupt and evil" (p. 31). This was largely true of the Slavophiles and their successors; but Bocheński seems to me to underrate the influence of "Westernizers" [*Zapadniki*] like Belinski, and Western-minded Nihilists like Chernyshevski and Dobrolyubov. And I think he is somewhat unfair both to Russian Orthodoxy and to the liberal elements within the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia.

Turning, after a brief account of the early Russian Marxists (Plekhanov, Bogdanov, and others), to the work of Lenin, Bocheński points out that he too had deep roots in the Russian past. Lenin's ascetic morality derives from that of the Populists [*Narodniki*], his machiavellianism from Tkachyov and Bakunin, his utilitarianism from Tkachyov (and, one might add, Chernyshevski). Lenin's contributions to Marxism, according to Bocheński, include: (1) The epistemological "theory of reflection," a radically realistic doctrine, which is combined with a radical rationalism and a defense of absolute and objective truth. This last conception, of course, is wholly foreign to Marx's thought and incompatible with the theory of "superstructures" which forms the core of historical

materialism. I must dissent from Bocheński's judgment that Lenin's epistemology is "original in many respects," but I agree that Lenin's epistemological and ontological views can not be adequately evaluated on the evidence of his *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (1909) alone; the *Philosophical Notebooks* (first published in 1929 and not yet translated into English), which reflect Lenin's Hegelian period (beginning in 1915) must also be taken into account. (2) A new emphasis on the function of the human will and the importance of human freedom in the historical process. Here Lenin in effect abandoned Marx's historical determinism; he left nature determined, but regarded human history as relatively free. (3) A view of dialectic which was much closer to Hegel than either Marx's or Engels' had been. Like Bakunin, Lenin stressed the *conflict* rather than the unity of opposites—in particular, the destruction of thesis by antithesis (e.g., bourgeoisie by proletariat). (4) Emphasis on the partisan character [*partiinost*] and class bias of all philosophy and science, a view which is implied but not emphasized in the Marxist theory of superstructures. Although Bocheński does not mention the fact, this doctrine was expressed in rudimentary form (and independently of Marx) during the 1860's by the Russian Populist social philosopher, N. K. Mikhailovski, and by the radical Nihilist Chernyshevski. But, whereas Mikhailovski restricted the application of this principle to the social sciences, and Chernyshevski limited it to philosophy, Lenin and his followers have extended it to the biological, physical, and even purely formal sciences. In 1948, for example, "apolitical formalism" in logic was condemned by the Soviet Minister of Higher Education. However, since Stalin's critique of Marr's doctrine of the class nature of language (1950) Soviet philosophers have suddenly discovered that logic, like language, transcends class distinctions; they now deny that there is such a thing as bourgeois or proletarian logic. (5) Lenin, finally, laid strong stress on religion. Bocheński explains this as a result of the intimate connection of Church and State in Tsarist Russia: to combat one was to combat the other. Lenin's anti-clericalism and anti-theologism are the chief grounds for his espousal of metaphysical materialism and epistemological realism. Here he is in the tradition of Bakunin's "ontological proof of atheism": "If God exists, man is a slave; but man can and must be free; therefore God does not exist." In Lenin's version this reads: idealism (i.e., non-realism) leads to an admission of the existence of God; but there is no God; therefore idealism is false. The major premise of this "argument" does not hold, of course, in the case of transcendental idealism. More

importantly, the minor premise rests on a *petitio principii:* the "theory of reflection," which asserts that all true or adequate ideas are copies of independently existing (material) realities, entails a denial of the reality of God, spirits, and souls—since nothing can be shown to correspond to these "ideas." Lenin's atheism thus rests on his realism, which in turn rests on his atheism! And, as Bocheński points out, Lenin rejects religious beliefs, as well as religious institutions, on moral and political rather than philosophical grounds. "God would be a dangerous competitor" for the active revolutionist, the engineer of history who regards nature and man as raw material for technical manipulation. To be sure, in using materialism and realism as anti-clerical and anti-theological weapons Lenin is continuing an ancient tradition; one thinks of Lucretius, Holbach, Diderot.

Bocheński offers an analogous psychological explanation of Lenin's rationalism and his assertion of the complete knowability of the world (Lenin asserted both doctrines without philosophical argument). As a revolutionist, committed to the transformation of nature and society by means of science and technology, he could not admit that there is any unknowable or noumenal dimension to being, any mysterious fringe inaccessible to man's practical and cognitive activity.

Bocheński feels that Lenin's defense of realism and categorial pluralism at a time when these positions were unpopular (1909), and his just appraisal of the rôle of reason in cognition (vs. "pure" empiricism) are positive contributions to philosophy. These, we may note, are all points of contact with Thomism. Bocheński also admires Lenin for his combination of thinker and man of action, and his recognition of the importance of philosophic thought—something unique among great revolutionary and military leaders.

In a concise historical survey of the development of Soviet dialectical materialism since 1917, Bocheński shows clearly how its two heterogeneous components—classical materialism and Hegelian dialectic—tended to separate and go their respective ways. The "Mechanists," headed by L. Akselrod, the outstanding woman philosopher of Soviet Russia, emphasized the materialism and neglected the dialectic; the opposing group, headed by A. Deborin (later dubbed "menshevizing idealists" by Stalin), laid almost exclusive emphasis on the dialectic. Their struggle culminated in 1930 with the official repudiation of Mechanism, followed a year later by the official repudiation of Deborinism. The "orthodox" position established in 1931 was an attempt to balance the two elements.

After a long period of relative quiescence, a new crisis was precipitated by Zhdanov's address to the philosophers in 1947. The next year or two saw a flurry of philosophic activity, but during the past two or three years this has largely subsided. Zhdanov, speaking for the Communist Party, had placed Soviet philosophers in a highly unenviable position. On the other hand, he accused them of sterility and "quotology," loudly urging them to create, to "produce." But in the same breath he demanded even more rigid doctrinal conformity, a more sharply partisan quality, thus effectively precluding originality and novelty. As a result philosophical production has decreased, even quantitatively, over the last two or three years. The new works have been either historical studies of "classical" Russian philosophers or the familiar mosaics of quotations from the "classics" of Marxism-Leninism, with a minimum of interpretation.

The only original work of importance to appear since the War was an article by the physicist M. A. Markov "On the Nature of Physical Knowledge," *Voprosy fil.*, No. 2 (1947), which set forth a number of interesting epistemological ideas with respect to cognition of microscopic phenomena. However, Markov's views were (rightly) regarded as incompatible with Lenin's theory of reflection; he was promptly accused of "idealism" and harshly criticized (*ibid.*, No. 3 (1948)). Since 1947 he has published no further philosophic works.

Ironically, in an "Afterword" dated March 31, 1950, Bocheński reports that all three of the Soviet philosophers whom he had characterized as relatively independent in their thinking (Markov, Asmus, and Kedrov) have since been rebuked, Kedrov and Asmus having made public recantations. At the same time, Bocheński deflates a popular misconception concerning philosophers whose views have been officially repudiated. Such men are not "liquidated" or sentenced to hard labor. Deborin, for example, whose views were condemned in 1931, although he has published no further philosophical works, has continued his editorial and teaching activities. I have been told by one of his students that he was teaching philosophy at Moscow University as late as 1945. He still holds the rank of Academician and the position of assistant editor of the *Vestnik* of the Academy of Sciences. Aleksandrov, the chief target of Zhdanov's attack in 1947, resumed philosophical publication in 1948.

The terminology of dialectical materialism, as Bocheński points out, urgently requires interpretation and clarification. "Materialism" (since Lenin) often means simply realism. "Idealist" is a

general term for anyone who rejects "materialism": Comte, Mach, Maritain, Dewey, and Carnap, as well as Plato and Kant, are all referred to as "idealists." "Dialectical" is often used to mean historical or dynamic as opposed to unhistorical or static; and, following Engels, "metaphysical" is customarily used in the peculiar sense of "non-dialectical." This list of ambiguous and special meanings could be considerably extended.

Bocheński states at one point that no non-Bolshevik philosophical works have been published in Russia since 1922; in another place he says that since 1921 no work of a living non-Marxist-Leninist philosopher has appeared in Russia, and he cites Dewey's *School and Society* (Moscow, 1921) as the last such work. Bocheński's general point is, of course, sound: philosophical publication is rigidly controlled by the State. But both of his statements are inaccurate. In addition to translations of the works of classical Western philosophers—Democritus, Aristotle, Bacon, Spinoza, Hegel, and others—which Bocheński himself mentions on p. 61, there have been a number of other exceptions. Among non-Marxists there are: (1) A. Losev, a metaphysician who combined Husserl, Hegel, and Russian religious philosophy in an original way, and published several books in 1927 and 1930; they were privately but not secretly printed in Moscow. (2) M. Rubinstein, an "ideal-realist," who published a general philosophical work privately in 1927. (3) Prince P. Kropotkin, the anarchist (died 1921), whose *Ethics* was published in 1922. (4) G. Chelpanov, a distinguished psychologist (died 1936), published a critique of the Marxist interpretation of Spinoza as a materialist and atheist in 1927.

Among non-Bolshevik Marxists whose philosophical works have appeared since 1922 we note: (1) A. Bogdanov (died 1928), a long article published in 1927; (2) Karl Kautsky (died 1938), several articles on ethics published in 1923 and reprinted in 1925. All of the works mentioned, except Losev's and Rubinstein's, were published by State publishing houses.

More recently certain works of living non-Marxist logicians have found official publication in Russia: e.g., Heyting, *Mathematische Grundlagenforschung,* 1936; Hilbert and Ackermann, *Principles of Mathematical Logic,* 1947; Tarski, *Introduction to Logic,* 1948. The last two works, to be sure, have since been sharply criticized, and Professor S. A. Yanovskaya, the editor of the Russian editions, has been publicly rebuked for failing in her introductions and commentaries to expose the "idealist" errors of the texts. She has recently made a public apology (*Voprosy fil.,* No. 3 (1950), pp. 331 ff.).

I do not mean to imply that philosophical publication has been free in the Soviet Union. Clearly, the above-listed cases are exceptions, and they have become increasingly rare. Since the early 1930's the only non-Bolshevik works to appear have been technical treatises on logic and scientific methodology. Nevertheless, such exceptions should not be wholly ignored.

This is not the place for a systematic exposition, however brief, of the doctrines of contemporary dialectical materialism. For this the reader should turn to Bocheński himself, or to Wetter—or better still, to both together. (Wetter's discussion, be it noted, ends with 1947.) I shall limit myself to brief mention of some of Bocheński's more interesting analyses and interpretations.

In discussing the "laws of dialectic," Bocheński makes the important point that the Engels-Lenin doctrine of "leaps"—the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes—and the doctrine of the conflict of opposites, although they are asserted as universal ontological theses, in fact spring from and are justified by a theory of class-conflict and revolution. (This extension of historical categories and doctrines to ontology and cosmology also has roots in nineteenth-century Russian thought.) Their philosophical foundation is extremely weak, and indeed is scarcely argued. These doctrines are accepted as tenets of faith for ideological and political reasons: they provide the "theoretical basis" for revolutionary practice.

Lenin's realism, Bocheński shows, is incompatible with his doctrine of the partisan character of philosophy and science. The opposite of this partisanship—"bourgeois objectivity"—has been under violent attack since 1947. Contemporary Soviet philosophers have made some attempt to reconcile the class nature of knowledge with epistemological realism, but their arguments end in a vicious circle. Every class, they assert, has its own philosophy (and its own science), but that of the proletariat is the only one which not only satisfies class needs and interests but is objectively true. What is the ground for this assertion? It is not simply (as Mikhailovski had once rather naively suggested) that the proletariat represents the overwhelming majority, the productive component, of mankind; rather, it is because the inevitable movement of history is thrusting the proletariat upward. It is the class "with a future," the class whose mission is to abolish class-distinctions, whereas the bourgeoisie, like all previous ruling classes, is in decline, doomed by history. The interests of the proletariat are thus the interests of history itself, and only proletarian philosophy and science are true, for they alone are "justified" by history. This is

where Soviet philosophers rest their argument, and Bocheński is content to leave the spelling out of their *petitio principii* to the alert reader: Clearly, the theory which asserts this dialectical movement of history is a part of class-knowledge, proletarian science (the Leninists admit this too in other contexts). Thus partisan (non-objective) class-knowledge establishes the dialectical movement, and this movement in turn is used as evidence that this same class-knowledge is objective (non-partisan and universal)!

After endorsing Bocheński's chief philosophical criticisms of dialectical materialism, I may be permitted a minor dissent. He says that he knows of no Russian Marxist work on ethical theory. In fact, several such works were published during the 1920's and early 1930's, and some of them are of considerable interest. Certain of the works on value theory and the foundations of morality published by Russian Marxists before 1917 rank with the best work in naturalistic ethics that was being done in Europe and America at that time. However, Bocheński is right when he states that "not a single question of theoretical ethics is [currently] discussed" (p. 154). Virtually nothing of theoretical interest has appeared in this field since 1936.

In summing up, Bocheński lists certain positive features of dialectical materialism: its emphasis on the importance of theory for practice and of philosophy for life, its overcoming of positivism (from a position of realism and rationalism), its respect for philosophy vis-à-vis politics and science. He finds that most of the theses of dialectical materialism are in essential agreement with common-sense notions—something which can not be said of other contemporary philosophies, such as logical postivism and pragmatism. This fact, together with a general ignorance of its specific doctrines, and the appeal of its social idealism, Bocheński feels, explain the success of dialectical materialism as an ideology. Its romantic, Promethean vision of *homo faber* transforming himself, society, and the cosmos, offers a psychological sanctuary from disillusioned skepticism. It is, in a word, an atheistic, immanentist religion. As a philosophy it remains on a primitive technical level and suffers from many internal contradictions, and as an ideology it is culturally alien to the traditions of the West.

The material contained in this book was originally presented as a series of lectures given in English at Fribourg in 1949 and later repeated in French. The present German version was translated from the French text, which may explain the inconsistencies in the transliteration of Russian words and names (pp. 6, 55, 137, 196). There are also a number of misprints (pp. 42, 44, 73, 137, 180, 188,

196, 197) and one or two minor errors in dates (pp. 37, 208). Among the book's many virtues is a very full bibliography of Russian and Western works on dialectical materialism.

It is to be hoped that the original English manuscript will soon find its way into print, bringing this valuable study to the wider audience which it deserves.

GEORGE L. KLINE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Eine Einführung in seine Lehre. ALFRED KASTIL. Bern: A. Francke A. G. Verlag. 1951. 337 pp. 21.50 s. fr.

The complete edition of Brentano's works, eleven volumes of which appeared between 1922 and 1932, was interrupted by the war, and since then no new volumes of the series have been brought out, though a few books by his pupils were published. In 1942 the Prague Brentano-Gesellschaft founded by Masaryk, which had been bringing out the series, lost its director and moving spirit, Oscar Kraus, and in the same year an attack on Leipzig destroyed a large part of the Brentano manuscripts. This double tragedy necessitated a change of plans. Since it would have taken years to piece together the writings preserved elsewhere in order to continue the series, it was decided that for the present it would be better to put out a general book on Bretano's philosophy, an overall picture of its last phase of development. Dr. Kastil was eminently suited to the task. For fifty years he had immersed himself in this philosophy and for a long period he had enjoyed the conversation and instruction of Brentano and his famous disciple, Anton Marty. On Brentano's death in 1917 Dr. Kastil and Oscar Kraus became his literary executors.

Much more comprehensive than Kraus's brief 1919 volume, *Franz Brentano, zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre,* Dr. Kastil's book expounds the main themes of Brentano's philosophy faithfully: the nature of conscious activity and its elementary differences, genuine and fictional objects, the continuum, space, time, and matter, theory of knowledge, ethics and rational theism, though one could wish that more space had been given to the theory of judgment and the Aristotelian studies. A short biographical sketch, which draws upon unpublished letters, recounts Brentano's intellectual growth, his break with the Church over the question of papal infallibility, his opposition to militarism, his contacts with famous philosophers and psychologists of the time. It is perfectly clear from this account that though Brentano was a man with a

mission, he welcomed criticism from even his closest followers, Marty and Kraus, believing, as he said, that renewed study of the disputed point would probably lead to clarification and enrichment. He himself made decisive changes, so that, as Kastil points out, his followers often found it difficult to keep up with him: "Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie,* Husserl's phenomenology, Marty's analysis of judgments, were all built on a base that Brentano had abandoned."

Kastil gives a terse account of the doctrine of intentionality, according to which every psychic phenomenon is essentially *auf etwas gerichtet,* and the reader is able to trace its ramifications through Brentano's psychology of sensation, his theory of fictional objects, his views on universals and classes, the doctrine of *modus rectus* and *modus obliquus,* and other aspects of his teaching. Developed late in Brentano's life, the theory of the two modes of thought has received little attention. That which we conceive *in recto,* as for example when we think of a whole containing parts, is the whole, whereas what is conceived *in obliquo* are the parts. The first is the "fundament," the second, "the terminus of the relation," which is always dependent on the specific nature of the fundament. By means of this distinction Brentano can explain with some adequacy how we are able to refer to, intend, or make judgments about, things which are not *anschaulich,* nor real objects of thought. Thus a man blind from birth on has a surrogate-concept of color as a quality of some kind at a place, where place is *in recto* and quality of some kind, *in obliquo.* Similarly, universals and classes of classes, including the class of all non-selfmembered classes, are conceived *in obliquo,* the fundament being something *anschaulich* or "abstracted" from *Anschauung.* In Brentano's view "to think of the concept of something" always means "to think of something conceptually," and "concept" is a synsemantic term. Brentano also uses the distinction to explain how a set of concepts, all of them universal, can mean an individual thing: the thing (say Adam) is identified *in recto* by predicates, but also *in obliquo* by the denial that anything else has them. All of this is reminiscent of Russell's theory of descriptions, and it is interesting to note that Russell has praised Brentano's work in synsemantics. Whereas Russell's theory is articulate and highly developed, Brentano's is suggestive and tries to cope with the psychology involved. There is some indication at present that the psychological approach can not be avoided, for there is always the question whether people mean by "*the* author of Waverley" what Russell says, whether his constructions would be acceptable outside of a certain logical tradition.

There is no question about the importance of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality. It committed psychology to a study of intentions, meanings, acts which refer beyond themselves, and assigned the content of the acts to physics. It split the psychological world into two camps, that of Brentano and that of Wundt, act-psychology and content-psychology. Important thinkers such as Stumpf and Külpe changed their minds and went over to Brentano, while others like Witasek and Messer evolved a dualistic psychology of act and content. In England Ward followed Brentano and American psychology was also strongly influenced. Kastil does not have time to discuss the repercussions of the doctrine of intentionality, nor the many-sided criticism of it. Some of these criticisms are still worth pondering. Titchener, for example, charged that of Brentano's three forms of intentionality, or objective reference, idea, judgment, and desire (love and hate), only the first fulfills the definition of a psychic phenomenon. For the objective reference of judgment and desire is due entirely to that of the constituent idea. He rightly called attention to the schematic, merely logical character of some of Brentano's key classifications, yet his efforts to argue away the intentionality of emotion or desire were pretty unsuccessful, and in the end he even admitted that psychology has to deal with meanings, that it was only a question of how. Here he found the weak point of Brentano's armor, his reliance on logic and common sense and on the philosopher's crucial experiment, even in technical papers on illusions. Although Brentano respected the laboratory, he did not always see the importance of the refinements and reversals it can effect.

Having the whole gamut of Brentano's philosophy condensed in one volume for the first time, thanks to Professor Kastil, its uneven merit is only the more conspicuous. Much of what he says about the categories seems, in spite of sharp introspections, quite unconvincing. How can one determine, for example, whether place presupposes extension or vice versa? And is not distinction between substance and accident rather trite, or controversial, if a causal explanation is ruled out? It is true that a causal explanation can lead to the awkward conclusion that there is only one substance, but also clear that it need not. Again, how significant is it that we are able, if we are, to imagine two objects with the same extension and two minds with the same thoughts? This might point to a difficulty in Descartes' theory of substance; but to establish postively what individualizes substances, would not empirical procedures be needed? Of course, Brentano's defense of Aristotelianism, with regard to the categories and other matters,

is always independent. He does not bow to authority, and objects, for example, when Aquinas, in order to uphold the eucharistic dogma, denies that extension is a substantial moment. At the same time, his reliance on the *a priori* is far beyond what one would expect in a professed empiricist.

Brentano's forte was not experiment nor detail, but the mapping of large foundations, and his insights are numerous. With regard to the intensity of sensation, for example, he cites Gauss and Euler to the effect that any quantity greater than another must have parts that are similar, and then asks what are the parts of the intensity of a tone, of a velocity, or of the distance between two colors. He concludes that what are called "intensive quantities," i.e., having no parts, are not quantities at all; and the problem is to discover their nature and why they are so called. Here the fact that a genuine quantity like the distance between two spatial points is measured by the shortest line between them, while that between two colors is measured by the least perceptible differences, is obviously suggestive. Brentano also has interesting things to say in the area of synesthesia. With Helmholtz he maintains that the opposition of *hell* and *dunkel* exists in every sense-field, though their intersensory meaning is only analogous; but here as elsewhere in the psychology of sensation experimental findings are not discussed.

We think of Brentano as introducing Aristotelian conceptions into modern philosophical and psychological controversy, and perhaps forget that, in letter or spirit, he also carried on the tradition of Leibniz, and that of English empiricism. Thus he insisted upon the sharp division between matters of fact (*verité de fait*) and relations of ideas (*verité de raison*), and, opposing Kant, declared that logic and mathematics are completely analytic. All factual knowledge, he held, takes the form of affirmative, assertoric judgments, and the negative and apodictic occur, not in immediacy but only when concepts are conjoined. Evidence is always of the present moment and not of what is remembered. But evidence characterizes inner perception, even when it is unclear and confused, as for example when we are sure that we hear a given tone though we have no idea what its partial tones are.

Brentano's theory of judgment and reconstruction of the doctrine of the syllogism are original, though they have received little attention. The essence of judgment, that which distinguishes it from idea and desire, is the opposition of assertion and denial. Thus belief (which in logic can be represented by the assert sign and other devices) is necessary to truth and falsity. Also, if we

believe an A is B, it would be self-contradictory to deny that an A exists, but since existence is not a predicate, the judgment "An A is" is "a simple, predicateless belief in A." It follows that "An A is not" and "An A is B, though A is not" are impossible. And since the negative judgment can not be other than universal (p. 88) the formal I and O are reformulated, respectively, as "Ein AB ist" and "Ein Ab ist," where b is the negative of B (p. 202). Similarly, because the usual interpretation of the universals is ambiguous, E and A are rendered respectively as "Ein AB ist nicht" and "Ein Ab ist nicht." Thus the particulars are both positive (which eliminates the negative from *immediate* experience), the universals are both negative, and the number of propositional forms is reduced from four to two. By means of these two propositional forms, all categorical conclusions (and indirectly, all hypothetical and disjunctive conclusions) can be reduced from two validity tables, both of which are the immediate consequence of the law of excluded middle, namely: (1) "Ein AB ist nicht" & "Ein A ist," hence "Ein Ab ist"; and (2) "Ein AB ist nicht" & "Ein Ab ist nicht," hence "Ein A ist nicht." Although Brentano developed this ingenious system independently, Couturat subsequently discovered a hitherto unknown paper of Leibniz, dated 1686, in which the same ideas were put forward.

Dr. Kastil's book reveals the subtlety and penetration of Brentano's thought in many fields, but also its limitations. In so far as he was an empiricist of a sort his views were bound to suffer by the progress of thought. It can be argued that his conclusions as to time, space, and matter, as to illusions and other psychological topics, were often dated, and one can suspect that his opposition to Darwin, to utilitarianism, and to naturalism in general, would have been tempered by the accumulation of scientific knowledge. In any case, modern functional psychology, and even purposive behaviorism, which is ultra-naturalistic, owe an indirect debt to Brentano. His counterposing of intentionality to structuralism was indeed prophetic. What he lacked besides the experimentalism we have already mentioned, was a sense for the quantitative, the statistical, and an appreciation of the social context. He might also have carried over in some fashion, as did Husserl, the genetic analysis he found in Hume, but it is perhaps churlish to complain of shortcomings more or less common to the time and tradition. Dr. Kastil has done an excellent inside job of exposition, the fidelity of which is not to be questioned. The reviewer, however, must register two complaints: although there is a thorough, analytical table of contents, there is no index; and secondly, there are no ref-

erences at all to Brentano's writings, either to those published in his lifetime or to the eleven posthumous volumes, so that the reader often has no idea what volume, or what stage of Brentano's philosophical development, is being discussed.

V. J. McGILL
HUNTER COLLEGE

The Greeks and Their Gods. W. K. C. GUTHRIE. Boston: Beacon Press. 1951. xiv, 388 pp. $3.75.

This is an exceedingly rich book and should be most welcome to students of Greek philosophy. Greek religion is a very perplexing inquiry at present and the non-specialist is in need of a competent guide through the complexities of recent discoveries and controversies. Mr. Guthrie's competence has already been well established by his *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (London, 1935). The present work is designed as a "kind of religious companion to the Greek classics." This purpose it accomplishes well. But the reader who expects to find merely an elementary handbook will soon discover that it is much more than this. The controversies of the specialists are not omitted, and a student who wishes to pursue any issue further is amply furnished with references to Nilsson, Linforth, Wilamowitz, Rose, Roscher, Farnell, and others. Mr. Guthrie's command of the primary data is firm and the conclusions he modestly sets forth have the additional authority of his immense knowledge of Greek literature and philosophy, and of his sound sense of psychological and social causes.

The religion of the Greeks of the classical period is the complex result of the fusion of two distinct types of religion: one the religion of the Olympians, impressed upon the Greeks in truly Olympian fashion by Homer, and the other the kind of worship represented by Eleusinian and other mystery cults and orgiastic rites. The mistake of early scholars was to regard this second element as of later origin than the Olympian religion. The evidence now conclusively shows that it is in reality the older. "Religion in Greece existed long before the Homeric poems. It had the gods of Homer imposed on it—one is sometimes tempted to add, accidentally—and its subsequent history may not unfairly be described as the struggle of religion, as the word is understood by most people today, to free itself from this incubus" (p. 294). Fertility cults with their worship of mother gods and Mother Earth, mystery cults with their rites of communion and ecstasy—these are the pre-Achaean strata which were overlaid but never altogether concealed by the Homeric religion. They remained vital factors in many

legends and local practices and in the hopes and fears of the ordinary man. What is more important, they influenced the Olympian religion itself, through the absorption into the Homeric scheme of many details from this more "primitive" worship.

It is a fascinating story that Mr. Guthrie tells us. Almost every one of the Olympian deities is a result of the mixture of these two factors. There is the Olympian Zeus of the bright sky, also identified with the Zeus of Crete, born in a cave, his cries concealed from his jealous father Cronos by the shouts and the tympani of the *kuretes* dancing around the mountain. There is Hera, a chthonian goddess of fertility, originally associated with Argos, who was promoted to be the Olympian consort of Zeus. Apollo, who is certainly non-Hellenic in his origin, has a strain of mysticism and ecstasy in his original worship. Transformed into the patron of law and order, the avenger of homicide and the god of purification, he retains to the end his mantic function and the capacity to produce ecstasy in his servants at Delphi. There is Artemis, the severely virgin huntress, who was originally, in all likelihood, a fertility goddess, and was still worshipped as such in Asia Minor, even among the Greeks. Hermes, the "god of the stone-heaps," always remained the protector of boundaries and the guide to the underworld, despite his role in the Homeric hierarchy as messenger of the gods. Even Athena, perhaps the most brilliant product of the Greek imagination, seems (according to Mr. Guthrie) to have been originally the mother-god of the acropolis rock at Athens. The invading Achaeans identified with her one of their goddesses, a Valkyrie-like deity, and transformed the primitive divinity they found at Athens into the resplendent maiden-goddess of their city-state, the patroness of the warlike and the civic virtues.

Even the worship of Dionysus shows this combination of the primitive and orgiastic with Olympian measure and light. The Great Dionysia, at which the plays of the tragedians were performed at Athens, had little in common with the nocturnal orgies of his original worship in Thrace and Phrygia. Yet the old Dionysus was not dead. He had been reconciled with Apollo at Delphi, but "in the winter months, when Apollo ceded his shrine to Dionysus, the *oreibasia* was carried out in all its glory on the highest parts of Parnassus by an officially sanctioned band of maenads" (p. 178). Euripides in the *Bacchae* was not describing a dead religion.

Yet the religion of Dionysus did not offer to the Greeks what it had offered to his original worshippers outside Greece, because the Thracian belief in immortality by communion was something

too foreign to their notions of the proper relations between man and god (p. 181). This leads us to what the author singles out as the central problem of this book: Did the Greeks think it possible or desirable for man to emulate the gods (p. 113)? "Which idea are we to take as the more truly representative of the Greek religious mind: that there was a great gulf fixed between mortal and immortal, between man and god, and that for man to attempt to bridge it was hybris and could only end in disaster, or that there was a kinship between human and divine, and that it was the duty of men to live a life which would emphasize this kinship and make it as close as possible (p. 114)?" θνητὰ φρονεῖν or ὁμοίωσις θεῷ? The author's conclusion is that the former remained to the end of the classical period the typical Greek view, supported by the this-worldliness of the Greek character, and the growth and nature of the city-state government (p. 294). The Eleusinian mysteries, very early adopted as a part of the official Attic cult, did little to undermine this widespread belief in a gulf between gods and men (pp. 290–292). As for the worship of Dionysus, the ordinary Greek mentality was inclined to empty it of the promise of immortality which it logically carried (pp. 180–181). Finally, the Orphic doctrines were a system of theogony and eschatology deliberately constructed in the sixth and fifth centuries out of popular tradition, and though they appealed greatly to Pindar, Empedocles, and Plato, they were not especially a religion of the lower classes and there is no evidence that they were widespread until a much later date (pp. 308 ff.).

Thus it appears that of the two components of Greek religion, that with which Mr. Guthrie seems to have the most sympathy did not free itself from the incubus of the Homeric scheme until the decline of the city-state had set in (pp. 256, 276)—and that is a part of the story that is not included in this book. Mr. Guthrie is entitled to his evaluation of these two strands, but it must be said that this evaluation gives his account of Greek religion a somewhat truncated effect. What is more serious, it prevents his duly appreciating the immense civilizing work produced by the Olympian religion upon the ungainly and barbarous elements that it transformed. It would seem more correct to say that in this respect as in so many others Homer was the teacher of the Greeks, not merely "an artificial break in the continuity of Greek religion" (p. 295), or "a hindrance to the development of a real and inward religion" (p. 276).

GLENN R. MORROW
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

NEW BOOKS AND CURRENT JOURNALS

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

BELLHOUSE, G. T.: *Immortal Longings.* [Sermons.] New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] vi, 128 pp. $2.75.

BERTIN, GIOVANNI MARIA: *Introduzione al problematicismo pedagogico.* Milano: Carlo Marzorati. [1951.] 307 pp. (Collezione filosofica, diretta da U. A. Padovani.) L. 1600.

BRYAR, WILLIAM: *St. Thomas and the Existence of God; Three Interpretations.* Chicago: Henry Regnery. 1951. xxv, 252 pp. $5.00.

BUTCHER, S. H.: *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art.* With a Critical Text and Translation of *The Poetics.* With a Prefatory Essay, *Aristotelian Literary Criticism,* by John Gassner. Fourth Edition. [New York:] Dover Publications. [1951.] lxxvi, 421 pp. $4.50.

The new introduction, by John Gassner, noted American critic, relates Aristotelian literary criticism to contemporary drama, poetry, and criticism.

CAPONE BRAGA, GAETANO: *Studi su Epicuro.* Milano: Carlo Marzorati. 1951. 109 pp. (Collana filosofica, diretta da U. A. Padovani.) L. 800.

CARLINI, ARMANDO: *Filosofia e storia della filosofia.* Milano: Carlo Marzorati. [1951.] 52 pp. (Collezione filosofica, a cura di Umberto A. Padovani.) L. 350.

CENTRO INTERNAZIONALE DI STUDI UMANISTICI—ROMA: *Umanesimo e scienza politica. Atti del Congresso Internazionle di Studi Umanistici, Roma-Firenze, 1949, a cura di Enrico Castelli.* Milano: Carlo Marzorati. 1951. xiv, 570 pp. L. 3000.

A large collection of papers in various languages presented at the International Congress of Humanist Studies in 1949. Among the few pieces in English, there is a letter of George Santayana to Professor Castelli, dated September 19, 1949 (pp. 365–367).

CONZE, EDWARD: *Buddhism; Its Essence and Development.* With a Preface by Arthur Waley. New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] 212 pp. $6.00.

CURRY, HASKELL B.: *Outlines of a Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics.* Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. 1951. vii, 75 pp. (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics; L. E. J. Brouwer, E. W. Beth, A. Heyting, Editors.) Fl. 7.50.

This monograph, one of the first in a new series of logical studies, is a suggestive sketch of the author's views on the nature of mathematics.

Despite some criticism of the syntactical approach (part of it now outdated, for this study was completed in all essentials in 1939), the formalist philosophy advocated does not differ substantially from the syntactical conception. It is argued that the formalist view is independent of any philosophical presuppositions, and is therefore compatible with almost any variety of general philosophy. Formalism is also claimed to be in good agreement with current forms of mathematical intuitionism, when the latter is freed from its inessential "metaphysical" dicta. There is included an interesting though brief discussion of the grounds for the "acceptability" of formal systems: the author urges the adoption of an "empirical" or "pragmatic" criterion for such acceptability; and he makes a strong plea for tolerance toward formal systems that contribute to the advance of empirical science, even if these systems appear to rest on dubious "metaphysical" underpinnings.

FAVILLA, PAOLO: *Il metodo integrale nella ricerca del vero.* Roma: Editore Lamagna. [1950.] 115 pp. L. 500.

FEIBLEMAN, JAMES K.: *Ontology.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1951. xix, 807 pp. $9.75.

FIRTH, RAYMOND: *Elements of Social Organization.* Josiah Mason Lectures Delivered at the University of Birmingham. New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] vii, 257 pp. $5.75.

The Meaning of Social Anthropology.—Structure and Organization in a Small Community.—Social Change in Peasant Communities.—The Social Framework of Economic Organization.—The Social Framework of Primitive Art.—Moral Standards and Social Organization.—Religion in Social Reality.

GONZÁLEZ ALVAREZ, ANGEL: *Introducción a la metafísica.* Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Instituto de Filosofía y Disciplinas Auxiliares. 1951. 393 pp.

HUBBEN, WILLIAM: *Four Prophets of Our Destiny: Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Kafka.* New York: Macmillan. 1952. viii, 170 pp. $2.75.

JONES, RICHARD FOSTER: *The Seventeenth Century; Studies in the History of English Thought and Literature from Bacon to Pope,* by Richard Foster Jones and Others Writing in His Honor. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. [1951.] viii, 392 pp. $7.00.

Marjorie Nicolson: Richard Foster Jones.—*Richard Foster Jones:* Essays: The Background of "The Battle of the Books." Science and Criticism in the Neo-Classical Age of English Literature. Science and English Prose Style in the Third Quarter of the Seventeenth Century. The Attack on Pulpit Eloquence in the Restoration: an Episode in the Development of the Neo-Classical Standard for Prose. Science and Language in England of the Mid-Seventeenth Century.—A Bibliography of the Published Writings of Richard Foster Jones.—*Louis I. Bredvold:* The Invention of the Ethical Calculus.—*Herbert Davis:* The Conversation of the

Augustans.—*John F. Fulton:* Some Aspects of Medicine Reflected in Seventeenth-Century Literature with Special Reference to the Plague of 1665.—*William Haller:* John Foxe and the Puritan Revolution.—*Edward Niles Hooker:* Pope on Wit: The "Essay on Criticism."—*Merritt Y. Hughes:* Milton's Treatment of Reformation History in "The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates."—*George B. Parks:* Travel as Education.—*George F. Sensabaugh:* Milton and the Attempted Whig Revolution.—*George Sherburn:* Pope and "The Great Shew of Nature."—*Clarence D. Thorpe:* Addison's Contribution to Criticism.—*E. M. W. Tillyard:* A Note on Dryden's Criticism.—*Virgil K. Whitaker:* Philosophy and Romance in Shakespeare's "Problem" Comedies.—*Helen C. White:* John Donne and the Psychology of Spiritual Effort.—*Basil Willey:* The Touch of Cold Philosophy.

JORDAN, E.: *Essays in Criticism.* With an Introduction and Synopses by Robert D. Mack. University of Chicago Press. [1952.] vii, 384 pp. $7.00.

KRAFT, VICTOR: *Die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Wertlehre.* 2., neubearbeitete Auflage. Wien: Springer-Verlag. 1951. vi, 264 pp. $3.80.

MARCEL, GABRIEL: *Homo Viator. Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope.* Translated by Emma Craufurd. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1951. 270 pp. $3.50.

MARGOLIS, LARRY: *We 3.* Text by Larry Margolis. Paintings by Otto Fried. Paris: Somogny. [1950.] 38 pp.

Philosophy of art.

ONIANS, RICHARD BROXTON: *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate; New Interpretations of Greek, Roman and Kindred Evidence, Also of Some Basic Jewish and Christian Beliefs.* Cambridge University Press. 1951. xvii, 547 pp. $9.00.

PADOVANI, UMBERTO A.: *Il problema religioso nel pensiero occidentale.* Milano: Carlo Marzorati. 1951. x, 212 pp. (Collezione filosofica, diretta da U. A. Padovani.) L. 1200.

PHILLIPPS, LISLE MARCH: *The Works of Man.* With an Introduction by Herbert Read. New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] xxiv, 330 pp. $4.75.

First published in 1911. "Selecting some of the great periods, or creative epochs, in the art of the world, I have endeavoured to deduce from them the distinguishing qualities, limitations, and point of view of the races which produced them." With 16 pages of half-tone plates.

PRA, MARIO DAL: *Nicola di Autrecourt.* Milano: Fratelli Bocca. [1951.] 195 pp. (Storia universale della filosofia, XVIII.) L. 700.

SCOTT, ANDREW MACKAY: *The Anatomy of Communism.* New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] xiii, 197 pp. $3.00.

SHERLEY-PRICE, LEO: *Confucius and Christ; a Christian Estimate of Confucius.* New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] 248 pp. $4.75.

SIEGMUND, GEORG: *Der kranke Mensch. Medizinische Anthropologie.* Fulda: Fuldaer Verlagsanstalt GMBH. 1951. 304 pp. 8.80 DM.

SINCLAIR, ANGUS: *The Conditions of Knowing; an Essay towards a Theory of Knowledge.* New York: Harcourt, Brace. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1951. 260 pp. $3.50.

Soviet Legal Philosophy. By V. I. Lenin, P. I. Stuchka, M. A. Reisner, E. B. Pashukanis, J. V. Stalin, A. Y. Vyshinsky, P. Yudin, S. A. Golunskii, M. S. Strogovich, I. P. Trainin. Translated by Hugh W. Babb, with an Introduction by John N. Hazard. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1951. xxxvii, 465 pp. (20th Century Legal Philosophy Series: Vol. V.) $7.50.

STOOPS, JOHN DASHIELL: *The Integrated Life.* New York: Richard R. Smith. 1951. 180 pp. $3.00.

TARSKI, ALFRED: *A Decision Method for Elementary Algebra and Geometry.* Second Edition, Revised. Prepared for Publication with the Assistance of J. C. C. McKinsey. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1951. iii, 63 pp. $2.75.

A photographic reprint of an important contribution to the foundations of mathematics first published by the Rand Corporation in 1948. Errors in the earlier edition have been corrected, and supplementary notes have been added which elaborate and enrich the original text.

THOMPSON, R. MOTSON: *Nietzsche and Christian Ethics.* New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] 104 pp. $2.75.

ULICH, ROBERT: *Crisis and Hope in American Education.* Boston: Beacon Press. 1951. xiv, 235 pp. $3.75.

The author, a former member of the Institute of Comparative Education, University of Leipzig, has taught at the Harvard Graduate School of Higher Education since 1934. He states in his Preface: "This book is an attempt at evaluating the educational system of the United States from the schools for the young up to the universities and the various forms of adult education."

VELTRI, LEONIDA: *Spiritualismo positivo.* Palermo: G. Mori. [1951.] 54 pp.

VOGT, V. OGDEN: *Cult and Culture; a Study of Religion and American Culture.* New York: Macmillan. 1951. vii, 269 pp. (The Minns Lectures.) $3.25.

WACH, JOACHIM: *Types of Religious Experience, Christian and Non-Christian.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [1951.] xvi, 275 pp. $3.50.

This collection of essays is primarily of interest to the student of history and sociology of religion, but the philosopher of religion will also find in it a wealth of factual material and critical interpretation. As an introduction to recent trends in the theory of religion this volume is especially useful. In Dr. Wach's treatment of the various historical subjects of his choice (Mahayana Buddhism, Sufism, Caspar Schwenckfeld, De Tocqueville) he illustrates admirably the significance of the methodological shift from evolutionary concepts to religious "typology." And in his more theoretical essays (especially in "Universals in Religion," "The Idea of Man in Near Eastern Religions," and "Rudolf Otto and the Idea of the Holy"), he discusses with skill and erudition the major problems in the philosophy of religion: the common core in all religions, the nature of revelation, the relation of man to God, the relation of religious organizations to secular society.

WALKER, KENNETH: *Venture with Ideas: Meetings with Gurdjieff and Ouspensky.* New York: Pellegrini & Cudahy. [1952.] xi, 212 pp. $3.25.

WARBEKE, JOHN M.: *The Power of Art.* New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] ix, 493 pp. $6.00.

WILLIAMS, GARDNER: *Humanistic Ethics.* New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] xii, 223 pp. $3.75.

WILLIAMS, HENRY HORACE: *Logic for Living; Lectures of 1921–22.* Edited by Jane Ross Hammer. New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] xix, 281 pp. $3.75.

WILSON, HOWARD E.: *Universities and World Affairs.* New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1951. 88 pp. $1.00.

ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE EN PSYCHOLOGIE, WAARIN OPGENOMEN DE ANNALEN VAN HET GENOOTSCHAP VOOR WETENSCHAPPELIJKE PHILOSOPHIE. 43e jrg., Afl. 5, Aug. 1951. *Jan Aler:* De situatie der filosofie in Duitsland; het Congres te Bremen (Oct. 1950). *J. H. v. d. Hoop:* Het Typologische en het Phenomenologische gezichtspunt. *E. W. Beth:* Nicolai Hartmann's Natuurphilosophie. *F. Wiersma-Verschaffelt:* Prof. Dr. Melchior Palágyi. *E. J. E. Huffer:* De Scholastieke Oordeelstheorie.—44e jrg., Afl. 1, Oct. 1951. *Bernard Delfgaauw:* Louis Lavelle in memoriam. *C. J. de Vogel:* Avicenna en zijn invloed op het West-Europese denken. *J. H. van der Hoop:* De betekenis der psychologie voor mens en gemeenschap. *P. W. A. Immink:* Over de draagwijdte van Uexküll's "Umwelt"-begrip. *D. Bartling:* Het Aesthetisch

Oordeel.—44e jrg., Afl. 2, Dec. 1951. *J. Clay:* Oorzakelijkheid, waarschijnlijkheid en doelmatigheid. *G. Nuchelmans:* Historische Kennis en Logisch Positivisme. *H. J. Pos:* Het levenswerk van Dr Françoise Minkowska. *S. Strasser:* Paul Ricoeur: Philosophie de la Volonté. *P. G. J. Vredenduin:* Het oordeel in de logistiek.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY (GENERAL SECTION). Vol. XLII, Part 3, Aug. 1951. Especially: *George Humphrey:* There Is No Problem of Meaning. *Leon Litwinski:* Toward the Reinstatement of the Concept of the Self.

ETHICS, AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. Vol. LXII, No. 1, Oct. 1951. *H. M. Kallen:* U. M. T. and the Nation's Schools in the Religion of Democracy. *Radoslav A. Tsanoff:* Moral Principles and National Interests. *Neal Riemer:* The Case for Bare Majority Rule. *George Nakhnikian:* Value and Obligation in Mill. *John Nelson Park:* Freedom, Value, and the Law: Three Paradoxes. *Harry F. Reinert, Jr.:* Evolutionary Ethics. *Douglas N. Morgan:* Philosophers in Spite of Themselves.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. Vol. XII, No. 4, Oct. 1951. *Wallace K. Ferguson:* The Interpretation of the Renaissance: Suggestions for a Synthesis. *Paul O. Kristeller:* The Modern System of the Arts: a Study in the History of Aesthetics. *John W. Yolton:* Locke's Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sergeant. *Edward A. and Lillian D. Bloom:* Joseph Addison and Eighteenth-Century "Liberalism." *Lynn Thorndike:* Newness and Craving for Novelty in 17th-Century Science and Medicine. *Kenneth E. Bock:* History and a Science of Man: an Appreciation of George Cornewall Lewis. *Jackson I. Cope:* William James's Correspondence with D. C. Gilman, 1877-1881.

THE THOMIST, A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW. Vol. XIV, No. 3, July 1951. *James M. Egan:* Blessed Pius X and Theology. *John A. Oesterle:* Toward an Evaluation of Music. *M. Whitcomb Hess:* Hegelianism and the Making of the Modern Mind. *Robert P. Sullivan:* Natural Necessitation of the Human Will. —No. 4, Oct. 1951. *James Collins:* Kierkegaard and Christian Philosophy. *Arthur E. Vassilion:* The Platonic Theory of Inspiration. *Robert P. Sullivan:* Natural Necessitation of the Human Will (Conclusion).

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

There is no similar journal in the field of scientific philosophy. It is issued fortnightly and permits the quick publication of short contributions, prompt reviews, timely discussions, notes on new books and other journals, and news of philosophic interest. The last five issues contain:

VOLUME XLVIII

No. 25. December 6, 1951.

Emotive and Existentialist Theories of Ethics. HANS MEYERHOFF.

Avoidability and the Contrary-to-Fact Conditional in C. L. Stevenson and C. I. Lewis. WILLIAM T. FONTAINE.

No. 26. December 20, 1951.

Philosophy and Ordinary Language. D. J. O'CONNOR.

A Postscript on Sense-Data. HENRY W. JOHNSTONE, JR.

VOLUME XLIX

No. 1. January 3, 1952.

Plausibility in Fiction. ROBERT T. HARRIS.

Review of James B. Conant's *Science and Common Sense* by RAPHAEL DEMOS.

No. 2. January 17, 1952.

UNESCO Report on the Investigation Concerning Freedom. H. J. Pos.

No. 3. January 31, 1952.

Criteria of Explanation in History. E. W. STRONG.

Some Aspects of Causation in History. E. J. TAPP.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

515 W. 116th St., New York 27, N. Y.

$5.00 per annum (26 numbers) single numbers, 30 cents; double numbers, 60 cents

A two-volume history of philosophy slanted toward contemporary life

A HISTORY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Frederick Mayer, Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of Redlands

Professors have found this unusual history of philosophy a veritable "shot in the arm" for their classes. Avoiding the dry, pedantic style so characteristic of the average history of philosophy text, Dr. Mayer has produced two books in tune with the times. He takes every opportunity to relate philosophical ideas to the student's own life. Thus the student ceases to regard philosophy as a vague, abstruse subject; he comes to regard it as a practical part of his own life . . . a part of great importance to himself as a person.

Two widely used texts designed for the modern student

LIVING ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY
• An Introductory Textbook

ETHICS FOR TODAY
• Second Edition

Harold H. Titus, Professor of Philosophy, Denison University

The author of these texts believes that the problems which seem pressing to students are vital issues today. His purpose in each book is to help students with these problems . . . to train them to see basic issues and to discern the values of life. The language employed is nontechnical and the author's facile style is conducive to the highest student interest.

American Book Company

55 Fifth Avenue
New York 3, N. Y.

300 Pike Street
Cincinnati 2, Ohio

351 East Ohio Street
Chicago 11, Illinois